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Equity over Equality: Equal
Protection and the Indian Child
Welfare Act
Lucy Dempsey*
Abstract
In 2018, a Texas District Court shocked the nation by
declaring the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) unconstitutional
pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The decision was overturned by the Fifth Circuit but may well be
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The ICWA provides a
framework for the removal and placement of Indian children
into foster and adoptive homes in such a way that attempts to
reflect the unique values of Indian culture and supports the
autonomy of the tribe. In doing so, the law treats Indian children
differently than it would White children. But does this divergent
treatment constitute impermissible racial discrimination?
Should the ICWA’s protections be applied to children merely
eligible for tribal membership? What level of scrutiny should
courts use when analyzing the ICWA’s constitutionality? This
Note will provide insight into these questions which the U.S.
Supreme Court has not yet addressed.

* J.D. Candidate May 2021, Washington and Lee University School of
Law. My deepest gratitude to Professor Joan Shaughnessy for her superb
edits, patient conversations, and knack for asking questions that forced me to
rethink everything. Special thanks also to Professor Sheryl Buske for
introducing me to this topic and teaching me so much. Thank you to the
Washington and Lee Law Review for their thoughtful guidance and to my
family for their endless encouragement. Finally, thank you to Chandler—in
this, as in all things, I am eternally grateful for your love and support.
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This Note provides a background of the ICWA and examines
the current constitutional controversy in the Fifth Circuit by
placing the ICWA in the larger statutory context of federal
Indian jurisprudence. This Note analyzes the fundamental
question raised in Indian law equal protection cases—whether
the term “Indian” should be interpreted as a racial or political
classification. An examination of precedent confirms the unique
status of Indians as non-racial, semi-autonomous actors who
often receive uncommon treatment. With this context in mind,
this Note explores past equal protection challenges to the ICWA
and lays out the current case. This Note recommends that the
Supreme Court uphold the Fifth Circuit’s finding of
constitutionality on the equal protection claim and provides two
possible analytical paths to reach that conclusion. The first
ascribes to the common argument that “Indian” should be viewed
as a political classification, subject to reduced scrutiny. The
second, however, questions the assumption that the application
of strict scrutiny is fatal to the ICWA, instead proposing an
alternative path forward drawing from Supreme Court
reasoning in affirmative action cases. This Note concludes that
future challenges to the ICWA should be struck down as the
ICWA passes all levels of constitutional scrutiny.
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Introduction

Since its origin, the Indian Child Welfare Act1 (ICWA) has
faced numerous constitutional challenges for its bold policy of
treating Indian2 children differently than non-Indian children
in child custody proceedings.3 Underlying and justifying this
differentiated treatment is a deep-seated history of
discrimination faced by Indian families from welfare agencies
and state court systems.4 Described by some lawmakers as a
“cultural genocide,”5 by the 1970s “a minimum of 25 percent of
all Indian children [were] either in foster homes, adoptive
homes, and/or boarding schools” instead of living with their
parents.6 The United States Congress responded by drafting the
ICWA, a complex federal statutory framework for the removal
and placement of Indian children into foster and adoptive homes
that attempted to “reflect the unique values of Indian culture”
and “[provided] for assistance to Indian tribes.”7 The ICWA’s
framework immediately sparked accusations of equal protection

1.

25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.
This Note will use the term “Indian” rather than “Native American”
or “Alaskan Native” in order to be consistent with the statutory language of
the ICWA. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) also uses the political term
“Indian” in its current recognition of 573 Indian tribes. See Indian Entities
Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau
of Indian Affairs, 84 Fed. Reg. 1200, 1200 (Feb. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Indian
Entities]. As this Note argues, the term “Indian” is political, not racial, and
thus it is especially crucial to use the designated term for the political
category.
3.
See Addie Rolnick & Kim Pearson, Racial Anxieties in Adoption:
Reflections on Adoptive Couple, White Parenthood, and Constitutional
Challenges to the ICWA, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 727, 727 (describing the ICWA
as “under fire” as challengers argue that it “interferes with adoptions and
violates the Constitution by doing so”).
4.
See Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Indian Affair, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Hearings] (“It
appears that for decades Indian parents and their children have been at the
mercy of arbitrary or abusive action of local, State, Federal, and private agency
officials.”) (statement of Sen. James Abourezk).
5.
Id. at 2.
6.
Id. at 1.
7.
25 U.S.C. § 1902.
2.
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violations. Even today, the ICWA, with its underlying purpose
of acknowledging important differences between Indian and
non-Indian children,8 challenges courts to address the
fundamental question of whether to prioritize equity of
semi-autonomous Indian tribes and their children over legal
equality.
In perhaps the most significant challenge to date, a Texas
federal district court struck down the ICWA as unconstitutional
in 2018.9 The reaction nationwide was one of outrage.10 The case
was appealed and a three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, affirming the
ICWA’s constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause.11
Shortly after the decision came out, however, the Fifth Circuit
voted to rehear the case en banc.12 Oral arguments in January
2020 garnered national attention in both the Indian and legal
community for the potential implications not only on the ICWA,
but on the constitutionality of all federal Indian law.13
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit produced a deeply divided opinion,
with a slim majority affirming the constitutionality of certain
ICWA provisions under the Equal Protection Clause, but
remaining equally divided on the constitutionality of others.14
8.
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7530 [hereinafter House Report] (“[ICWA’s purpose is] to
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum Federal
standards for the removal [and placement] of Indian children . . . which will
reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .”).
9.
Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 543–44 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
10.
See, e.g., Official Statement: Joint Statement on Indian Child Welfare
Case Brackeen v. Zinke Ruling, NAT’L CONG. INDIAN AM. (Oct. 8, 2018), https://
perma.cc/QYB4-8K9J (“This egregious decision ignores the direct federal
government-to-government relationship and decades upon decades of
precedent that have upheld tribal sovereignty and the rights of Indian
children and families.”).
11.
Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 425–30 (5th Cir. 2019).
12.
Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 942 F.3d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2019).
13.
See Leah Litman & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Necessity of the
Indian Child Welfare Act, ATLANTIC (Jan. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/Z2XGN56U (“In Brackeen, Texas has mounted nothing less than a frontal attack on
the entire corpus of federal law that governs Indian affairs today.”).
14. Brackeen v. Haaland, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at
*7–8 (5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2021) (“The district court’s ruling that provisions of
ICWA and the Final Rule are unconstitutional because they incorporate the
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This convoluted ruling will likely be appealed to the Supreme
Court.15 This Note will endeavor to address whether the ICWA
is constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.16
This Note will proceed as follows: Part II will bring into
focus the historical and political landscape behind the
implementation of the ICWA in the late 1970s. Part III will
provide a broad survey of equal protection jurisprudence
relating to federal Indian laws throughout history, illustrating
the unique status of quasi-sovereign Indian tribes in an equal
protection context. Next, Part IV will narrow the focus to equal
protection as applied to the ICWA in particular and the various
challenges the statute faces. The most recent constitutional
challenge will be analyzed in detail in Part V with a close
examination of the recent Fifth Circuit opinion.17 This Note will
argue that the Fifth Circuit correctly approached the equal
protection issue, acknowledging the unique status of Indian
tribes and adhering to supporting precedent in federal Indian
law. This Note will conclude that, whether under strict scrutiny
or rational basis review, courts should uphold the
constitutionality of the ICWA. The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning
provides a model which the United States Supreme Court
should follow, solidifying the constitutionality of this crucial
statute under the Equal Protection Clause.

“Indian child” classification is therefore reversed, but its ruling that
§ 1915(a)(3) and (b)(iii) violate equal protection is affirmed without a
precedential opinion.”). The en banc majority also found the ICWA to be
unconstitutional under the anticommandeering doctrine but this is beyond the
scope of this Note. Id. at *8–9.
15.
See Roxanna Asgarian, How a White Evangelical Family Could
Dismantle Adoption Protections for Native Children, VOX (Feb. 20, 2020,
7:30AM), https://perma.cc/9U34-484F (“Native advocates say it’s likely that
whatever the ruling [of the Fifth Circuit], the decision will be appealed to the
Supreme Court.”).
16.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17.
Brackeen v. Haaland, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957 (5th
Cir. Apr. 6, 2021).
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II.

Background of the ICWA
A.

Legislative History

The United States Congress enacted the ICWA in 1978 as
an attempt to “establish standards for the placement of Indian
children in foster or adoptive homes [and] to prevent the
breakup of Indian families.”18 Congress lamented how, for years,
“an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families [were] broken
up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from
them by nontribal public and private agencies.”19 State social
services agencies and courts placed many of these children in
non-Indian foster and adoptive homes.20 Other children were
removed from their homes and sent to federal boarding
institutions, which contributed acutely to the “destruction of
Indian family and community life.”21 The children were often
isolated from their families and taught by instructors who
possessed “very little understanding and appreciation of the
children’s native languages and traditions.”22 In 1971, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) reported over 34,500 children
living in its federal boarding school and dormitory facilities.23 In
18.
25 U.S.C. § 1901; see House Report, supra note 8, at 8 (stating the
purpose of the ICWA’s federal standards to be “protect[ing] the best interests
of Indian children” and promoting “the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families”).
19.
Id. § 1901(4); see House Report, supra note 8, at 9, 11; Miss. Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32–33 (1989) (characterizing the
ICWA as stemming from rising national concern over “the consequences to
[Indian children, families, and tribes] of abusive child welfare practices that
resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their
families and tribes through adoption or foster case placement, usually in
non-Indian homes”).
20.
25 U.S.C. § 1901(4).
21.
House Report, supra note 8, at 9; see Ann Piccard, Death by Boarding
School: The Last Acceptable Racism and the United States’ Genocide of Native
Americans, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 137, 141 (2013) (describing the use of Indian
boarding schools as “an act of genocide under international law” which was
designed “not to educate those children but, instead, to instill in them the
whites’ belief that everything ‘Indian’ was bad, inferior, and evil”).
22.
B.J. JONES ET AL., THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK: A
LEGAL GUIDE TO THE CUSTODY AND ADOPTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN CHILDREN 2
(A.B.A. 2d ed., 2008).
23.
See House Report, supra note 8, at 9 (representing that over 17
percent of the school-aged Indian population on federal reservations lived in
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the 1950s, the government partnered with both state and
private agencies to create the Indian Adoption Project, which
adopted out Indian children primarily to non-Indian families to
further the “Indian extraction” policy.24
Congress realized that these intrusive practices by
non-Indian actors had fomented the separation of hundreds of
Indian families and ultimately contributed to the loss of future
tribal members.25 An Association of American Indian Affairs
survey in 1974 indicated that “approximately 25–35% of all
Indian children are separated from their families and placed in
foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions.”26 Congress was
particularly troubled by the reasons given for the majority of
these removals. Non-Indian social workers based 99 percent of
the removals on vague categories of “neglect” or “social
deprivation” rather than any charges of physical abuse.27
Non-Indian social workers and judges often found fault with
commonplace Indian child-rearing behavior.28 Social workers
institutions, with tribes such as the Navajo Reservation seeing 90 percent of
their K-12 children shipped off to boarding schools).
24.
See ELLEN SLAUGHTER, UNIV. OF DENVER RSCH. INST., INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 61 (1976), https://perma.cc/7XN86LGR (PDF) (explaining the then-prevailing “Indian extraction” policy as
seeking to reduce reservation populations, reduce boarding school costs, and
satisfy a “large demand for Indian children on the part of Anglo parents”).
25.
See House Report, supra note 8, at 9 (“The wholesale separation of
Indian children from their families is perhaps the most tragic and destructive
aspect of American Indian life today.”); 1974 Hearings, supra note 4, at 2
(stating that the welfare agency’s “stealing” of children “strike[s] at the heart
of Indian communities”) (statement of Sen. James Abourezk).
26.
Id. at 9. The report shared disturbing details about “[t]he disparity in
placement rates for Indians and non-Indians” throughout the country. Id. For
example, the report stated, South Dakota had seen 40 percent of all adoptions
over the past decade involve Indian children, although Indians made up “only
7% of the juvenile population.” Id. In Wisconsin, the chance that an Indian
child would be separated from their parents was nearly 1,600 percent greater
than for a non-Indian child. Id.
27.
See id. at 10 (explaining how many cases were argued merely on
allegations of emotional damages inflicted on the child from living with their
parents).
28.
See id. (“Many social workers, untutored in the ways of Indian family
life or assuming them to be socially irresponsible, consider[ed] leaving the
child with persons outside the nuclear family as neglect and thus as grounds
for terminating parental rights.”); JONES, supra note 22, at 3 (arguing that
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regularly made decisions Congress considered “wholly
inappropriate” in the context of Indian cultural values and
social norms.29
In addition to the removals themselves, Congress also
began to question the methodology with which states placed
children in adoptive or foster homes. Discriminatory standards,
based on “middle-class values,” disqualified most Indian
families from fostering or adopting Indian children.30 As a
result, by 1969, a survey of sixteen states showed that
approximately 85 percent of Indian children in foster homes
were living with non-Indian families.31 Congress believed that
many of the states actively failed to “recognize the essential
tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”32
The commonly accepted standard for child welfare litigation is
non-Indian social workers remained ignorant of the traditional Indian ways of
child-rearing such as leaving children with grandparents for extended periods
of time); Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints under the Indian Child Welfare
Act: Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J.
587, 603–04 (2002) (“[S]tate child welfare officials were insensitive to
traditional Indian approaches to child rearing, in particular the widespread
practice of involving members of a child’s extended family in significant
caregiving.”).
29.
See House Report, supra note 8, at 10 (asserting social workers’
conclusions regarding Indian children’s emotional risk and Indian parents’
caregiving abilities to be blinded by bias and a lack of respect for systemic
cultural differences).
30.
See id. at 11 (“Discriminatory standards have made it virtually
impossible for most Indian couples to qualify as foster or adoptive parents,
since they are based on middle class values.”); Atwood, supra note 28, at
604 – 05 (“Applying majoritarian middle-class values, state workers often
construed [Indian child-rearing] practice[s] as neglect or even abandonment.
In addition, high rates of alcoholism and poverty were relied on as
justifications for removing Indian children from their communities.”).
31.
House Report, supra note 8, at 9; see Allison Krause Elder, “Indian”
as a Political Classification: Reading the Tribe Back into the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 13 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 417, 418 n.10 (2018) (explaining that
the phenomenon of Indian children ending up in non-Indian homes can also
be attributed to the Indian Adoption Project of the 1950s, as well as a
well-known campaign “Kill the Indian, Save the Child” (citing Lila J. George,
Why the Need for the Indian Child Welfare Act?, 5 J. MULTICULTURAL SOC.
WORK 165 (1997))); FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE 243 (2009)
(citing one of the leading educators and spokesmen for federal boarding
schools, William Pratt, as espousing the primary goal “to kill the Indian and
save the man”).
32.
25 U.S.C. § 1901(5).
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the “best interest of the child” standard (BICS).33 The BICS
prioritizes, above all, providing the child with the opportunity
to psychologically bond with at least one adult “who is perceived
by that child as his or her psychological parent.”34 Some believe
that the ICWA, by considering not only the individual child’s
interest but also that of the greater tribe,35 creates an inherent
tension between tribal and individual welfare, making it
incompatible with the BICS.36
Others reject this notion, arguing that the ICWA instead
merges the two interests and, in doing so, exemplifies “the gold
standard” of child welfare by creating provisions which
“maintain a safe environment for the child while preserving as
many of a child’s connections as possible.”37 The ICWA embodies
33.
See JONES, supra note 22, at 12 (noting that this theory was
popularized by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit in their well-known book Beyond
the Best Interest of the Child); Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental
Truth about Best Interests, 54 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 113, 160 (2009) (“The [BICS] is
a creature of common law, existing from time immemorial and has become the
bedrock of our state custody statutory law. . . . At its core the [standard] is
designed to identify and reinforce the child’s fundamental right to a loving and
nurturing parent-like relationship.”).
34.
JONES, supra note 22, at 12; see Brief for Casey Family Programs et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 5, Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937
F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-11479) [hereinafter Casey Brief] (“Child
welfare’s core principle is that children are best served by preserving and
strengthening their birth family relationships.”).
35.
House Report, supra note 8, at 8 (“The purpose of [the ICWA] is to
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families . . . .” (emphasis added)).
36.
See Timothy Sandefur, Escaping the ICWA Penalty Box: In Defense of
Equal Protection for Indian Children, 37 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 12–13 (2017)
(arguing that the ICWA’s placement preferences override individual
consideration of a child’s personal best interests, “except in the rarest of
circumstances”); Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Beyond the Best Interests of the Tribe:
The Indian Child Welfare Act and the Adoption of Indian Children, 66 U. DET.
L. REV. 451, 453 (1989) (“For the Indian children who may become involved in
protracted controversies about their adoptive placement the ICWA goal of
promoting their best interests may be undermined by the ICWA’s other goal
of ensuring insuring tribal survival.”); Jones, supra note 22, at 12 (noting that
the ICWA’s holistic, tribal goals have been perceived as straying from the “best
interest of the child” theory).
37.
Casey Brief, supra note 34, at 4–5 (explaining that the central
interest in child welfare—maintaining family integrity—includes an interest
in preserving “the mesh of ties that surround a child, from the closest ties
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the “realization that Native Americans have unique practices
and traditions regarding child-rearing that are not susceptible
to judgment using a non-Indian barometer.”38 These traditions
revolve around semi-autonomous tribal communities and
therefore necessitate tribal considerations to be folded into an
Indian child’s BICS analysis.39 Similarly, the ICWA’s goal of
protecting the stability and security of Indian tribes is
inextricably linked with the protection of Indian children.40
Congress drafted the ICWA to promote the unique best interests
of Indian children and tribes by addressing tribal considerations
in child welfare proceedings and eliminating “subjective values”
imposed by judges and state welfare officials which previously
controlled the evaluation of Indian children’s best interests.41 To
do so, Congress provided an objective, yet individualized,
framework to assist decision-makers in properly evaluating the
best interests of Indian children by taking tribal interests into

(birth parents, siblings), to extended family, to the child’s broader
community”). The placement provisions prioritize keeping children within the
child’s birth family first, then placement with extended family (even without
tribal connection), and finally members of the child’s broader community,
including the child’s tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (b). The role of tribal
placements forms “a context-specific application of the universal best practice
of preserving as many of a child’s connections to the community as possible.”
Casey Brief, supra note 34, at 5.
38.
JONES, supra note 22, at 12.
39.
Casey Brief, supra note 34, at 6 (“Thus, ICWA’s interest in preserving
a child’s ties to a tribe . . . is best understood as implementing the universal
best practice of prioritizing placements that will maintain as many of a child’s
networks, and as much stability and sense of identity, as possible.”); Tanya A.
Cooper, Racial Bias in American Foster Care: The National Debate, 97 MARQ.
L. REV. 215, 244 (2013) (“The best interests of Native American children are
inherently tied to the concept of belonging.”).
40.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (“[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children . . . .”);
Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture,
Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 602 (1994)
(“With the disappearance of the younger generation, Native American tribes
would lose the conduit of their cultures.”).
41.
See House Report, supra note 8, at 15 (“Moreover, judges too may find
it difficult, in utilizing vague standards like ‘the best interests of the child’, to
avoid decisions resting on subjective values.”).
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account while remaining loyal to the fundamental facets of the
BICS.42
B.

Provisions of the ICWA

This carefully drafted decision-making framework includes
both procedural and substantive provisions all designed “to
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the
stability and security of Indian tribes and families.”43 To protect
these interests the ICWA sets out three primary objectives: (1)
eliminating the removal of Indian children due to cultural bias
and ignorance; (2) placing validly-removed Indian children in
foster or adoptive homes that reflect their unique culture and
background; and (3) increasing tribal court adjudication of child
custody proceedings.44 In keeping with these objectives, the
statute is “jurisdictionally stringent in favor of tribal court
jurisdiction, creates minimum federal standards for the removal
of Indian children from their homes by the state, and establishes
strict placement preferences that must be followed by state
courts.”45
The ICWA applies to all state court child custody
proceedings involving an Indian child.46 Child custody
proceedings are defined by the statute to encompass: (1) foster
care placements; (2) termination of parental rights; (3)

42.
Casey Brief, supra note 34, at 16–17 (explaining how the statute
“mandates structured placement preferences while permitting customized
consideration of each child’s needs” by including a departure from placement
preferences upon a showing of “good cause” (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (b))).
43.
25 U.S.C. § 1902.
44.
Id. § 1901; JONES, supra note 22, at 4–5.
45.
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 31, at 243 (interpreting the statute to aim
to accomplish these three primary objectives).
46.
Under the ICWA, “Indian child” is defined as “any unmarried person
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b)
is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). This definition gives tribes
ultimate power to define who is an “Indian child” based on their own
membership criteria. See Elder, supra note 31, at 422 (“Rather than impose
their own understanding of Indian identify, Congress chose to defer to tribal
standards for membership eligibility. Key to the ICWA, this definitional power
reflects Indian tribes’ status as sovereign nations, as well as the importance
of children to tribal sovereignty.”).
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pre-adoptive placement; and (4) adoptive placement.47 In any of
these proceedings involving one or more Indian children, ICWA
imposes minimum federal procedural requirements that are
unique to Indian cases.
First, the ICWA grants tribal courts jurisdiction over
Indian child custody proceedings. Exclusive jurisdiction is given
to tribal courts when the child in question is a resident or
domiciliary of the reservation.48 If the child is not a resident or
domiciliary of a reservation, a state court “in the absence of good
cause to the contrary shall transfer such proceeding to the
jurisdiction of the tribe.”49 This concurrent jurisdiction for the
tribe can be obtained upon the petition of either of the child’s
parents, the child’s Indian custodian,50 or the Indian child’s
tribe.51 Furthermore, the Indian child’s tribe(s) has the right to
intervene “at any point in the proceeding.”52 In general, the
ICWA favors a transfer of jurisdiction to tribal courts of a child
custody proceeding, barring any unusual findings made by the
state court judge.53 Tribal courts may decline to take individual
cases.54 In order to facilitate an intervention or transfer, notice
is also a crucial requirement under the ICWA.55 In any
involuntary child custody proceeding where a party knows or
has reason to believe that the child involved is an Indian child,
there is “an affirmative obligation on the part of all parties, and

47.

25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
Id. § 1911(a).
49.
Id. § 1911(b).
50.
See id. § 1903(6) (“‘Indian custodian’ means any Indian person who
has legal custody of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State
law or to whom temporary physical care, custody, and control has been
transferred by the parent of such child.”).
51.
Id. § 1911(b).
52.
Id.
53.
See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989)
(determining that the jurisdictional transfer provisions of the ICWA create
“presumptive” tribal court jurisdiction).
54.
See JONES, supra note 22, at 6 (describing how many tribes
consciously decline transfers due to a lack of resources to provide for their
children and a hope that the state and county agencies can provide better).
55.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (“[T]he party seeking the foster care
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify
the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe, by registered mail
with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of
intervention.”).
48.
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their attorneys, to report such to the court so that notice may be
given to the Indian child’s tribe.”56 Notice must also be given to
the child’s parents and, if applicable, to an Indian custodian.57
Finally, various other procedural standards appear in the ICWA
that apply only to Indian children. These include the necessity
of expert testimony,58 the provision of rehabilitative services,59
and enhanced burdens of proof.60 To sustain a termination of
parental rights, the court must find beyond a reasonable doubt
that certain requirements are shown.61 To involuntarily place
an Indian child in foster care, the court must find “clear and
convincing evidence” that allowing the child to remain in their
parent’s custody “is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage.”62

56.
JONES, supra note 22, at 5. Heated judicial debate exists amongst
state courts on carving out an exception to the definition of “Indian child,” and
thus avoiding triggering the ICWA, for otherwise qualified Indian children
who have not lived with an Indian family or live with an Indian family with
few or no ties to an Indian tribe. Id.; see, e.g., In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099,
1108 (Okla. 2004) (overturning precedent from a prior 1992 decision, In re
S.C., which had adopted the “Existing Indian Family Exception,” and noting
that the Oklahoma legislature expressly rejected the exception).
57.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).
58.
Id. § 1912(f) (requiring expert testimony of a qualified expert witness
that the child remaining in their current home is “likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage”).
59.
Id. § 1912(d) (“[A]ctive efforts have been made to provide remedial
services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the
Indian family. . . .”). In cases involving non-Indian children, merely
“reasonable efforts” are required to preserve and reunify families after
children have been taken into state custody. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15);
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086 (2019); IOWA CODE § 232.102(5)(b) (2019); MINN.
STAT. § 260.012(a) (2019).
60.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(e).
61.
Id. § 1912(f). In contrast, in cases involving non-Indian children, a
termination of parental rights case necessitates only a “clear and convincing
evidence” burden of proof. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982)
(concluding that this standard “strikes a fair balance between the rights of the
natural parents and the State’s legitimate concerns”).
62.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(e). In cases involving non-Indian children, states use
lower burdens of proof for involuntary foster care placements including
“reasonable grounds” or “probable cause.” See Sandefur, supra note 36, at 42
(arguing that ICWA’s higher evidentiary standard fails to strike a balance
between parental rights and children’s safety by making it harder for state
officers to gather sufficient evidence to remove a child).
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The ICWA also contains substantive provisions creating
placement preferences designed to promote the placement of
removed Indian children into homes that reflect their unique
culture and background.63 There are placement preferences for
both foster care64 and adoptive65 placements, and both allow
flexibility for tribes to exercise their discretion, so long as the
placement is the “least restrictive setting appropriate to the
particular needs of the child.”66 This flexibility exemplifies the
purpose of the ICWA by giving Indian tribes autonomy and
deference in evaluating an Indian child’s best interests.67 These
preferences create a hierarchy which state courts must ascribe
to when placing Indian children.68 Altogether, the ICWA’s
provisions take into account innate differences between Indian
and non-Indian children using higher burdens of proof, unique
placement preferences, and flexibility for tribal intervention. In
singling out Indian children for differentiated treatment in
these ways, however, the statute has drawn constitutional
scrutiny from critics.

63.
See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36 (proclaiming the “most important
substantive requirements imposed upon state courts” to be the placement
preferences in § 1915).
64.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b)
In any foster care or preadoptive placement, a preference shall be
given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement
with (i) a member of the Indian child’s extended family; (ii) a foster
home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child’s tribe; (iii)
an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non
Indian licensing authority; or (iv) an institution for children
approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organization
which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child’s needs.
65.
See id. § 1915(a) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under
State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the
contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2)
other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”).
66.
Id. § 1915(c).
67.
See Elder, supra note 31, at 423 (“The ICWA essentially presumes
that it is in the Indian children’s best interest to be with family in their tribe,
or with other tribal members, unless the tribe itself determines otherwise.”).
68.
See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 31, at 244 (explaining that the
placement preferences “are designed to facilitate placement with Indian
families and institutions” and are “socially and culturally defined and subject
to tribal revision” only).
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Constitutional Concerns of the ICWA

Perhaps the most controversial facet of the ICWA is the
provision stipulating the persons to whom the act can be
applied. The act applies to any “Indian child,” defined as “any
unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a
member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in
an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe.”69 There is little debate over the constitutionality
of applying the ICWA to children who are registered members
of a federally recognized70 Indian tribe in clause (a). Clause (b)
of this definition, however, raises constitutional questions under
the Equal Protection Clause71 as to whether the inclusion of
children “eligible for membership in an Indian tribe” constitutes
an illegitimate racial classification.72 Eligibility for membership
varies by tribe, with each tribe possessing complete autonomy
in choosing the factors to assess.73 Race can play a large role in
69.

25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
The term “Indian tribe” is defined in the ICWA in § 1903(8) as:
[A]ny Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or
community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services
provided to Indians by the Secretary [of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs] because of their status as Indians, including any Alaska
Native village as defined in section 3(c) of the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act.
Thus, unrecognized tribes which are not eligible for federal funding or services
cannot assert the ICWA. See id. (excluding all but those “recognized” tribes);
see also Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services from
the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 84 Fed. Reg. 1,200, 1,200 (Feb. 1,
2019) (containing the most recent official list of 573 tribal entities recognized
by and eligible for funding and services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs).
This Note will use the term “tribe” as it is used under the ICWA itself in
reference only to federally recognized Indian tribes.
71.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72.
See infra Parts IV–V.
73.
See Tribal Enrollment Process, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, https://
perma.cc/Y2YG-UZ2S.
Tribal enrollment criteria are set forth in tribal constitutions,
articles of incorporation or ordinances. The criterion varies from
tribe to tribe, so uniform membership requirements do not exist.
Two common requirements for membership are lineal decendency
from someone named on the tribe’s base roll or relationship to a
tribal member who descended from someone named on the base roll.
70.
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eligibility, but, depending on the tribe, is not necessarily
determinative.74
The Supreme Court recently weighed in on a case involving
a child with a non-custodial biological Indian father, but avoided
overtly addressing any of the ICWA’s potential equal protection
concerns.75 In its second-ever interpretation of the statute,76 the
Court in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl decided against applying
the ICWA’s protections to non-custodial Indian fathers.77
Although the decision hinged on whether the ICWA should
apply to non-custodial Indian fathers,78 the 5–4 majority opinion
repeatedly emphasized its reluctance to apply the statute where
a child was only “3/256 Cherokee.”79 However, the case involved
no dispute over the child’s status as an “Indian child.”80 The
(A “base roll” is the original list of members as designated in a tribal
constitution or other document specifying enrollment criteria.)
Other conditions such as tribal blood quantum, tribal residency, or
continued contact with the tribe are common.
74.
See Russell Thornton, Tribal Membership Requirements and the
Demography of “Old” and “New” Native Americans in CHANGING NUMBERS,
CHANGING NEEDS: AMERICAN INDIAN DEMOGRAPHY AND PUBLIC HEALTH 103, 107
(1996) (using BIA tribal enrollment data to demonstrate that “many [tribes]
have no minimum blood quantum requirement” requiring instead “only a
documented tribal lineage”). Thornton’s research shows that by the
mid-twentieth century 98 out of 302 federally recognized Indian tribes had no
blood quantum requirement—primarily those without a reservation base. Id.
75.
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 655–56 (2013) (hinting
at potential equal protection concerns raised by the ICWA “put[ting] certain
vulnerable children at a great disadvantage solely because an ancestor—even
a remote one—was an Indian”).
76.
See infra Part IV (explicating Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield, the Supreme Court’s first case interpreting the ICWA).
77.
Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 654 (rejecting the argument that ICWA
provision § 1912(d) barred termination of biological father’s parental rights in
the instant case).
78.
See id. at 643 (stating that the Father was a member of the Cherokee
Nation).
79.
Id. at 646 (“It is undisputed that, had Baby Girl not been 3/256
Cherokee, Biological Father would have had no right to object to her adoption
under South Carolina law.”). The majority provided no explanation or
rationale for the use of this specific number. Id.
80.
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 398 S.C. 625, 635 (2012) (“[I]n January
2010 the Cherokee Nation first identified Father as a registered member and
determined that Baby Girl was an “Indian Child,” as defined under the
[ICWA].”). As a baby who had not been formally enrolled, it can be assumed
that Baby Girl was classified as an “Indian child” under § 1903(4)(b) due to (1)
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dissent called out the majority’s rhetoric for hinting at “lurking
constitutional problems [which] are, by [the majority’s] own
account, irrelevant to its statutory analysis, and accordingly
need not detain [this opinion] any longer.”81 This case
reinvigorated the debate over the constitutionality of the ICWA
but provided no concrete answers.82 Thus, with little guidance
from the Supreme Court on equal protection as applied to the
ICWA specifically, it is instructive to contextualize the ICWA
within the Court’s broader jurisprudence on equal protection
and federal Indian law in general.
III. Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law
A.

The Doctrine of Equal Protection

The guarantee of equal protection only appears explicitly in
the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from
making or enforcing any law which “den[ies] to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”83 The
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause enumerates
individuals’ rights under federal law, but makes no specific
her eligibility for tribal membership under Cherokee law and (2) her father’s
enrolled status as a member of the tribe.
81.
See Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 690–91 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(chastising the majority for needlessly referencing the child’s 3/256th
Cherokee ancestry and “do[ing] no more than creat[ing] a lingering mood of
disapprobation of the criteria for membership adopted by the Cherokee
nation”).
82.
See, e.g., Christopher Deluzio, Tribes and Race: The Court’s Missed
Opportunity in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 34 PACE L. REV. 509, 558 (2014)
(criticizing the Court for using “the ICWA’s statutory text as a useful life raft
to avoid the choppy waters of ICWA’s fundamental equal protection flaws” and
“perpetuat[ing] the legal fiction necessary to justify rational basis review of
Indian classifications”); Bethany R. Berger, In the Name of the Child: Race,
Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. REV. 295,
336 (2015) [hereinafter Name of the Child] (characterizing the Court’s
“ominous” references to equal protection concerns as “deliberately vague” and
“built upon air”); Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 588–92 (2014) (stating that “the majority—despite its
brief allusion to equal protection—would itself apply no meaningful
constitutional scrutiny to the ICWA” and that, the Court would not “seek to
extend [its ‘colorblind’ approach to affirmative action] to the family law
domain”).
83.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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mention of equal protection.84 The Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, however, treats the equal protection analysis of
federal laws under the Fifth Amendment the same as that of
state laws under the explicit Fourteenth Amendment.85 As a
result, in the context of Indian law, where most equal protection
concerns are raised by federal laws which affect or single out
Indians,86 a law’s constitutionality is analyzed as if the Fifth
Amendment itself explicitly included an equal protection
requirement for federal laws.
The equal protection analysis begins with the question of
upon what basis a law has drawn a distinction to treat a certain
class of people differently.87 Depending on the nature of the
basis for that decision, the court applies different standards of
review and grants varying amounts of deference to the law.88 If
the decision is based on a non-suspect classification, such as
politics or age, the law is usually constitutional as long as there
exists a rational basis—a legitimate government purpose
fulfilled by rationally related means—for the distinction.89
Classifications based on race, however, are more suspect, and
are evaluated under strict scrutiny and granted less deference.90
Under strict scrutiny, the government must assert a compelling

84.
U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 (“[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
85.
See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (acknowledging that
the concepts of due process and equal protection are not mutually exclusive);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (emphasizing
that any “untenable distinction between state and federal racial
classifications” in equal protection cases “lacks support in our precedent, and
undermines the fundamental principle of equal protection as a personal
right”).
86.
Since the country’s founding, Congress has singled out Indians in
federal law. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have the
power . . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
87.
See Christopher R. Leslie, The Geography of Equal Protection, 101
MINN. L. REV. 1579, 1583–84 (2017) (describing the first step of the equal
protection analysis).
88.
See id. (discussing the different standards of review).
89.
See id. (explaining the varying levels of deference afforded
classifications).
90.
See Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499 (“Classifications based solely upon race
must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our
traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.”).
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purpose and prove that it used necessary means to achieve that
purpose.91
More often than not, once the court chooses to apply strict
scrutiny in an equal protection case, the government loses and
the classification is declared unconstitutional.92 However, there
are a few notable cases where the government prevailed despite
the application of strict scrutiny.93 In Grutter v. Bollinger,94 a
prospective student challenged the University of Michigan Law
School’s admissions policy as unconstitutionally racially
discriminatory.95 The student alleged that her application was
rejected because Michigan gave certain minority groups,
including Native Americans, preferential treatment over White
applicants.96 The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny but
pushed back on the concept that strict scrutiny is “strict in
theory, fatal in fact.”97 Instead, the Court saw the standard of
review as “designed to provide a framework for carefully
91.
See Leslie, supra note 87, at 1584 (describing the government’s
burden under strict scrutiny (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227)).
92.
See Roy G. Jr. Spece & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, 40
VT. L. REV. 285, 312 (2015) (summing up the authors’ formulation of strict
scrutiny, which interprets precedent case law as implicitly requiring the
government to meet the burden of proof of six elements in order to prevail
under strict scrutiny).
93.
See generally, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct.
2198 (2016).
94.
539 U.S. 306 (2003). In Grutter’s companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244 (2003), the Court held Michigan’s undergrad admission policy to
be unconstitutional.
95.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315–18 (explaining that, besides Law School
Admission Test scores, the policy purported to take a “holistic” approach and
consider soft variables including diversity—racial and otherwise—to fulfill the
school’s commitment to achieving a level of diversity with the “potential to
enrich everyone’s education”).
96.
See id. at 317 (“Petition alleged that respondents discriminated
against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . . [in that] the Law School use[d] race as a ‘predominant’
factor, giving applicants who belong[ed] to certain minority groups [preference
over white applicants].”).
97.
See id. at 326–27 (emphasizing that “[a]lthough all governmental
uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it”). The
Court acknowledged the constitutionality of race-based actions when they
became “necessary to further a compelling governmental interest” as long as
“the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied.” Id.
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examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons
advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race
in that particular context.”98 With those principles in mind, the
Court examined the policy and found a compelling
governmental interest at stake, justifying the school’s use of
race-based action.99 A central pillar of this finding relied on the
Court’s respect for educational institutions which “occupy a
special niche in our constitutional tradition.”100 Additionally,
the Court gave weight to the expert studies and reports which
demonstrated “the educational benefits that flow from student
body diversity.”101
The Court also found that the means chosen were
specifically and narrowly tailored to accomplish this purpose,
satisfying the second prong of strict scrutiny.102 The holistic
process was necessary because there was no alternative way to
advance the goal of gaining a diverse student body.103 Further,
the school did not use impermissible tools like quotas, but only
considered race as a “plus” or one factor in each applicant’s
file.104 The Court, satisfied with the school’s showing of previous
failed attempts to increase diversity through race-neutral
alternatives, stressed that narrow tailoring “does not require
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”105
Finally, the race-conscious admissions policy did not unduly
harm individuals who were not members of the favored racial
group.106
98.

Id. at 331–32.
See id. at 328 (holding that the law school has a compelling interest
in attaining a diverse student body).
100.
Id. at 329.
101.
Id. at 330.
102.
See id. at 333–34 (noting that the narrowly tailored inquiry “must be
calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student
body diversity in public higher education”).
103.
See id. at 333 (“The Law School has determined, based on its
experience and expertise, that a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities
is necessary to further its compelling interest in securing the educational
benefits of a diverse student body.”).
104.
See id. at 334 (emphasizing that “[t]o be narrowly tailored, a
race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system”).
105.
Se id. at 339–40 (describing failed alternatives).
106.
See id. at 341 (“[I]n the context of its individualized inquiry into the
possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School’s
99.
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Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law

The varying standards of review used in equal protection
inquiries, determined by whether a classification is race-based,
distills many federal Indian law equal protection claims down
to one question: whether the term “Indian” should be
interpreted as a racial or political classification. Whether or not
the terms “Indian” or “Indian tribes” are considered “racial”
determines the standard of review and, often, the ultimate
outcome of an equal protection challenge.107 In considering this
question, it is useful to examine past equal protection challenges
to federal Indian legislation.108 One of the seminal moments in
Indian equal protection jurisprudence was the Morton v.
Mancari109 decision in 1974.110 In Mancari, the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld a state statute, which defined “Indian” in
part based on blood, after determining the law to be rationally

race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority
applicants.”).
107.
See, e.g., Sandefur, supra note 36, at 60 (“Whether [ICWA’s differing
treatment of Indian children from non-Indian children] is constitutional or not
depends on whether it is regarded as race-based or as based on the nature of
tribes as political units.”). Alternatively, some scholars argue that even under
a racial classification, all federal Indian law should be reviewed with rational
basis scrutiny. See, e.g., Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not Strictly Racial: A
Response to Indians as Peoples, 39 UCLA L. REV. 169, 173–74 (1991) (arguing
for the abandonment of strict scrutiny in all Indian equal protection cases
because of the unique obligation of the federal government to protect Indian
culture under Article I of the United States Constitution).
108.
See Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal
Indian Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (2010) [hereinafter Reconciling]
(“Although questions regarding the congruence of Indian law and equal
protection may seem more pressing now, they have existed since the framing
of the Fourteenth Amendment and have reappeared at key moments in its
history.”).
109.
417 U.S. 535 (1974).
110.
See Reconciling, supra note 108, at 1171 (arguing that the Supreme
Court sought to use Mancari to reconcile equal protection doctrine with federal
Indian policy and that subsequent decisions, while maintaining the doctrinal
reconciliation, have “failed to develop its normative justification, leaving the
doctrine vulnerable to challenge and backlash”).
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related to the tribes’ unique political status and thus not a racial
classification.111
Mancari involved a provision of the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 which gave preference in hiring to Indian employees
in the BIA.112 To be eligible for preference, the individual “must
be one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a member of
a Federally recognized tribe.”113 In order to determine the
standard of review, the Court analyzed whether or not the
preference constituted “invidious racial discrimination” under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.114 The Court
focused on the “unique legal status of Indian tribes under
federal law” and “the plenary power of Congress . . . to legislate
on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes.”115 The existence
of this “special relationship” created an “assumption of a
‘guardian-ward’ status” between Congress and the political
bodies of Indian tribes.116 In light of this relationship, the Court
found that “[l]iterally every piece of legislation dealing with
Indian tribes” singles out constituencies of tribal Indians.117 The
Court decided that this differential treatment, derived from a
unique historical relationship and “explicitly designed to help
only Indians,” did not constitute racial discrimination.118 The
111.
See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554 (“The preference, as applied, is granted
to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of
quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the
BIA in a unique fashion.”); Reconciling, supra note 108, at 1186 (“Therefore,
Mancari held, different treatment of Indian people by the federal government
is not subject to the strict scrutiny reserved for racial classifications, but
instead will be upheld if it ‘can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’
unique obligation toward the Indians.’” (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555)).
112.
See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 537 (describing non-Indian appellees
challenging the provision “such qualified Indians shall hereafter have
preference to appointment to vacancies in any such positions” as violative of
the Fifth Amendment).
113.
Id. at 553.
114.
Id. at 551.
115.
Id. at 551–52 (basing Congress’ plenary power in the Constitution’s
explicit Commerce Clause and the history of treaties being used by Congress
to “deal with” tribes).
116.
Id.
117.
Id. at 552.
118.
See id. (noting that if such laws were invidious racial discrimination,
then “an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively
erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians
would be jeopardized”).
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Court’s opinion contextualized the Indian Reorganization Act as
part of a legislative history imbued with the aim of increasing
Indian self-governance through participation in BIA
operations.119 The preference, the opinion stated, formed part of
a larger goal to give “Indians a greater control of their own
destinies” and correct for past injustice and “[t]he overly
paternalistic approach of prior years.”120
The Court concluded that the preference did not constitute
racial discrimination nor could even be considered a “racial”
preference.121 The Court emphasized that the preference was
“granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather,
as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities,” making the
classification political, not racial, in nature.122 Thus, the Court
applied rational basis and found that the special treatment
could be “tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique
obligation toward the Indians.”123 The Court also looked
favorably upon the fact that the preference applied narrowly to
employment in the BIA124 and was “directly related to a
legitimate, nonracially based goal.”125 In upholding the
preference, the Mancari Court also relied upon extensive

119.
See id. at 541–44 (finding the purpose of the Indian Reorganization
Act to be “to establish machinery whereby Indian tribes would be able to
assume a greater degree of self-government, both politically and
economically”).
120.
Id. at 553.
121.
See id. at 553–54 (characterizing the preference instead as an
employment criterion working to “further the cause of Indian self-government
and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups”).
122.
Id. at 554.
123.
See id. at 555. (“Here, where the preference is reasonable and
rationally designed to further Indian self-government, we cannot say that
Congress’ classification violates due process.”).
124.
See id. at 554 (clarifying that the preference does not cover other
government agencies or activities and does not serve as “a blanket exemption
for Indians from all civil service examinations”).
125.
See id. (noting that such a legitimate goal is “the principal
characteristic that generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial
discrimination”).
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precedent which affirmed legislation that “singles out Indians
for particular and special treatment.”126
In the wake of the Mancari decision, federal circuit courts
across the country have recognized “Indian tribes” as a political
classification.127 The United States Supreme Court itself
reaffirmed the wide scope of Mancari’s principles in all Indians
affairs with two cases decided in the late 1970s. The first, Fisher
v. District Court,128 involved a pre-ICWA adoption proceeding
arising on a reservation and involving only Indian parties.129
There, the Court concluded that state court jurisdiction over the
adoption would interfere with the Northern Cheyenne Tribe’s
powers of self-government, conferred upon the tribe by federal
statute.130 Thus, pursuant to the tribal constitution, the parties

126.
Id. at 555 (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705 (1943)
(federally granted tax immunity); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411
U.S. 164 (1973) (same); Simmons v. Seelatsee, 384 U.S. 209 (1966) (statutory
definition of tribal membership, with resulting interest in trust estate);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (tribal courts and their jurisdiction over
reservation affairs).
127.
See, e.g., Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 933–35 (9th Cir.
2005) (relying heavily on Mancari to determine that the statute in question
“subjects [defendant] to Navajo criminal jurisdiction not because of his race
but because of his political status as an enrolled member of a different Indian
tribe”); Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 773 F.3d
977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]here differential treatment serves to fulfill the
federal government’s special trust obligation to the tribes as quasi-sovereign
political entities, tribal preferences are permissibly based on political
classifications.” (internal citations omitted)); Peyote Way Church of God, Inc.
v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th Cir. 1991) (using Mancari’s reasoning
to uphold a statute allowing for possession of peyote on the basis that members
of the Indian church who used the peyote are “limited to Native American
members of federally recognized tribes who have at least 25% Native
American ancestry”); United States v. Garrett, 122 Fed. App’x 628, 632 (4th
Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that preferences given to Indian tribes are not
racial but political in nature and asserting that Mancari is on point precedent
for any cases “dealing with Native American preferences”); Kahawaiolaa v.
Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the notion that
“distinctions based on Indian or tribal status can never be racial
classifications” but acknowledging that “the recognition of Indian tribes
remains a political, rather than racial determination”).
128.
424 U.S. 382 (1976).
129.
Id. at 383.
130.
See id. at 387–89 (determining that no congressional intent existed
to confer jurisdiction upon state courts over adoptions by Indians on a
reservation).
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were required to use tribal court.131 The Court dismissed the
notion that denying the parties access to state courts constituted
impermissible racial discrimination on the grounds that “[t]he
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from
the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi—sovereign
status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under federal law.”132
The opinion stated that the disparate treatment was
justified, even if it denied an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a
non-Indian plaintiff had access, because “it [was] intended to
benefit the class of which [the Indian] is a member by furthering
the congressional policy of Indian self-government.”133 The term
“class,” used in the context of quasi-sovereignty and
self-government, equates the term “Indian” with the status of
being a “tribal member” in a political sense, as opposed to a
purely racial classification.134
A year later in United States v. Antelope,135 the Court
assessed whether federal criminal statutes violated the Fifth
Amendment by “subjecting individuals to federal prosecution by
virtue of their status as Indians.”136 The Court, citing Mancari
extensively, found the “Indian” classification to be political and
went so far as to state that any “federal regulation of Indian
affairs is not based upon impermissible classifications.”137 The
Court grounded this broad statement in the undeniable history
of Indian tribes operating as semi-sovereign communities with
their own political institutions.138 Again, the Court underscored
131.

See id. at 389 (“[T]he jurisdiction of the Tribal Court is exclusive.”).
Id. at 390.
133.
Id. at 390–91 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–55 (1974)).
134.
See Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n,
443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979) (reiterating that treaties can confer enforceable
special benefits on Indian tribes and that the “particular semisovereign and
constitutionally recognized status of Indians” justifies special treatment
subject to rational basis scrutiny).
135.
430 U.S. 641 (1977).
136.
Id. at 642.
137.
See id. at 646 (emphasizing that the determination of “Indian” as a
political classification in the statute in Mancari applied more broadly to any
type of federal regulation of Indian affairs).
138.
See id. (“Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore is governance
of once-sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of
a ‘racial group consisting of Indians . . . .’” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 (1974))).
132.
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the non-racial character of the term “Indian” by highlighting
that the federal criminal statutes applied to the respondents not
because of their race, but because of their tribal enrollment.139
Antelope continued to distinctly separate the concept of “Indian”
as a race from that of tribal affiliation, which, although often
including people of the Indian race, the Court viewed as
non-racial and political in nature.140
In another 1976 case, Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation,141 the Supreme Court
rejected an equal protection challenge to a claim of tribal
immunity from Montana tax statutes.142 There, the Court
doubled down on its willingness to single out constituencies of
tribal Indians “for particular or special treatment.”143 The Court
reaffirmed statutory preferences involving Indians to be neither
invidious nor racial in character and applied a rational basis
test to determine merely if the statute rationally fulfilled
“Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.”144
Further reinforcing the unique status of Indians as
non-racial, the Supreme Court explicitly limited Mancari to
members of federally recognized Indian tribes. In another
seminal case, Rice v. Cayetano,145 the Court struck down a
statute limiting voting rights to those of “native Hawaiian”
descent.146 The State of Hawaii barred a Hawaiian citizen from
voting for the trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA)
on the grounds that his ancestry did not qualify him under the

139.
See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646–47 (“We therefore conclude that the
federal criminal statutes enforced here are based neither in whole nor in part
upon impermissible racial classifications.”).
140.
See id. at 645 (“The decisions of this Court leave no doubt that federal
legislation with respect to Indian tribes, although relating to Indians as such,
is not based upon impermissible racial classifications.”).
141.
425 U.S. 463 (1976).
142.
See id. at 479–80 (“We need not dwell at length on this constitutional
argument, for assuming that the State has standing to raise it on behalf of its
non-Indian citizens and taxpayers, we think it is foreclosed by our recent
decision in Morton v. Mancari.” (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555
(1974))).
143.
Moe, 425 U.S. at 480 (citing Morton, 417 U.S. at 554–55).
144.
Id. (citing Morton, 417 U.S. at 555).
145.
528 U.S. 495 (2000).
146.
See id. at 522 (“A State may not deny or abridge the right to vote on
account of race, and this law does so.”).
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statute as a “Hawaiian” or “native Hawaiian.”147 The citizen
argued the statute was unconstitutional under the Fifteenth
Amendment, which guarantees U.S. citizens the right to vote
regardless of race.148 The Court rejected Hawaii’s arguments
that the classification was not racial and held the state’s “denial
of petitioner’s right to vote to be a clear violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment.”149
In Rice, the Court examined the history of the Fifteenth
Amendment and its ongoing purpose to “reaffirm the equality of
the races.”150 In the years since the Civil War, the Court
developed the precedent of using the Fifteenth Amendment to
invalidate statutes which do not mention “race,” but instead use
the term “ancestry” to “effect a transparent racial exclusion.”151
The Court stated that ancestry was being used in the Rice
statute as a proxy for race.152 In response, the state attempted
to analogize native Hawaiians to members of Indian tribes
enjoying employment preferences in Mancari.153 The Court
noted, but did not definitively address, a fundamental
dissimilarity between native Hawaiians and organized Indian
tribes.154 The Court showed deep skepticism that native
Hawaiians, as the result of a few federal laws regarding land,
had achieved “a status like that of Indians in organized tribes”
giving Congress “broad authority to preserve that status.”155
147.
See id. at 510 (quoting the statute’s definition of “Hawaiian” as a
descendent of the aboriginal people in Hawaii in 1778 and “native Hawaiian”
as a descendent of “not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the
Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778”).
148.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
149.
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000).
150.
Id. at 512.
151.
See id. at 513–14 (citing Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)).
152.
See id. at 514 (“Ancestry can be a proxy for race. It is that proxy
here.”).
153.
See id. at 518 (explaining how the state uses Mancari, and its theory
of quasi-sovereign authority in the BIA, to defend its decision “to restrict
voting for the OHA trustees, who are charged so directly with protecting the
interests of native Hawaiians”).
154.
See id. at 518–19 (“It is a matter of some dispute, for instance,
whether Congress may treat the native Hawaiians as it does the Indian
tribes. . . . We can stay far off that difficult terrain, however.”).
155.
Id. at 518.
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Regardless, even if native Hawaiians and Indians
hypothetically could be legally analogized, the Court stated,
Congress still could not constitutionally authorize a state to
create a voting scheme that “limits the electorate for its public
officials to a class of tribal Indians, to the exclusion of all
non-Indian citizens.”156 The Court took pains to differentiate the
right to vote for public officials from other scenarios where
Congress may constitutionally enact preferential legislation
dedicated to Indian tribes’ needs.157
By recognizing the status of the OHA as a state agency, the
Court also tacitly acknowledged the difference between native
Hawaiians and Indians.158 The Court emphasized that Indian
tribes’ uniquely political and quasi-sovereign status gives a
governing agency such as the BIA the constitutional ability to
apply preferential hiring treatment.159 In contrast, the Rice
Court noted that an agency such as the OHA does not govern a
quasi-sovereign group.160 The Court distinguished Mancari,
emphasizing that “[a]lthough the classification [there] had a
racial component,” the preference in Mancari was not directed
towards a “racial group consisting of Indians but rather only to
members of federally recognized tribes,” making it political,

156.
157.

Id. at 520.
See id. at 519 (enumerating several constitutional examples of
Congress granting a certain constituency of tribal Indian unique treatment).
Specifically, the Court stated that voting in tribal elections can be restricted
only because the elections are an “internal affair of a quasi-sovereign.” Id. at
520. The OHA elections, in contrast, “are the affair of the State of Hawaii.” Id.
158.
See id. at 521 (“Although it is apparent that OHA has a unique
position under state law, it is just as apparent that it remains an arm of the
State.”).
159.
See id. at 519–20 (“The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians
not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal
entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique
fashion.” (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974))).
160.
See id. at 522 (“Nonetheless, the elections for OHA trustee are
elections of the State, not of a separate quasi-sovereign, and they are elections
to which the Fifteenth Amendment applies.”). Other courts have underscored
Rice’s distinction between the rights of individuals being subject to equal
protection concerns, while the legal relationship between political entities,
namely Indian tribes, allows for differing treatment. See Kahawaiolaa v.
Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “at its core, Rice
concerned the rights of individuals, not the legal relationship between political
entities”).
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rather than racial, in nature.161 Without federal recognition or
quasi-sovereignty, the native Hawaiian classification fell firmly
in the racial category and the Court refused to uphold the
statute.162
These cases form a clear narrative of the Supreme Court’s
approach to challenges to federal Indian laws. The Court’s
decisions evince the unique status of Indians as non-racial,
semi-autonomous actors who often receive uncommon and
exceptional levels of deference.
IV. Equal Protection and the ICWA
This Note will now examine constitutional challenges to the
ICWA, keeping in mind the greater framework of Indian law
equal protection jurisprudence. ICWA equal protection claims
center around whether the statute’s definition of “Indian child”
should be viewed as an impermissible racial classification.163
Critics of the ICWA attempt to portray the classification as
racial in nature,164 while supporters argue that a racial
interpretation of the term “Indian” is inconsistent with the
ICWA’s original purpose in protecting tribal sovereignty.165
161.
See Rice, 528 U.S. at 519–20 (internal quotations omitted) (citing
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 533 (1974)).
162.
See id. at 522 (“To extend Mancari to this context would be to permit
a State, by racial classification, to fence out whole classes of its citizens from
decisionmaking in critical state affairs. The Fifteenth Amendment forbids this
result.”).
163.
See Elder, supra note 31, at 420 (describing a recent equal protection
challenge to ICWA as “depending heavily on a reading of the Act as race-based
legislation, with the goal of achieving strict scrutiny review and crippling the
ICWA”).
164.
See, e.g., Christopher Deluzio, Tribes and Race: The Court’s Missed
Opportunity in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 34 PACE L. REV. 509, 510 (2014)
(arguing the ICWA often acts as “a naked racial preference for those with
Indian blood”); Sandefur, supra note 36, at 62–63 (“Eligibility for tribal
membership universally depends on biological ancestry. It follows
syllogistically that ICWA applies to a racial group consisting of Indians.”).
165.
See, e.g., Abi Fain & Mary Kathryn Nagle, Close to Zero: The Reliance
on Minimum Blood Quantum Requirements to Eliminate Tribal Citizenship in
the Allotment Acts and the Post-Adoptive Couple Challenges to the
Constitutionality of ICWA, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 801, 810 (2017)
(“[C]lassifying American Indians as a ‘race’—as opposed to classifying them as
citizens of Tribal Nations that enjoy a sovereign-to-sovereign relationship with
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Other than through a vague allusion to equal protection
concerns in Baby Girl,166 the Supreme Court has addressed the
constitutionality of the ICWA only once—in Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.167 Neither of these decisions offers
definite conclusions on whether “Indian” is racial or political,
but the Court’s discussion provides assistance in interpreting
the ICWA.168 Holyfield focused on a claim challenging whether
two Indian twins169 were “domiciled” on a reservation for
purposes of the ICWA,170 but the case “reveals a larger debate
about whether the ICWA is intended to protect tribes, Indian
families, or both.”171 The majority opinion weighed the rights of
Indian tribes heavily in assessing whether the children were
domiciled on the reservation and thus under the exclusive
jurisdiction of tribal court.172 After considering the ICWA’s
legislative history, the Court emphasized that the statute’s
purpose in protecting tribal interests corresponded with that of

the federal government—finds no support in the Fourteenth Amendment, and
as a result, [ICWA using ‘Indian’ as a criterion] in no way violate[s] equal
protection principles.”); Elder, supra note 31, at 437 (proposing the
classification of “Indian” as political due to the deference to the tribes’
definition of “Indian” and “the important tribal interest at stake in
maintaining sovereignty, based on legislative history and the historical
context of Indian identity in the United States”).
166.
See supra notes 75–82 and accompanying text.
167.
490 U.S. 30 (1989).
168.
See Elder, supra note 31, at 429 (suggesting that the Court’s two
interpretations of the ICWA in each case mirror the racial-political dichotomy
and “highlight the difficulty of treating Indian legislation under traditional
equal protection doctrine”).
169.
The twins were both “Indian children” within the meaning of the
ICWA because, at birth, they were both eligible for tribal membership and
their parents were both enrolled members of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)(b).
170.
See id. § 1911(a) (“An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as
to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who
resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such
jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law.”
(emphasis added)).
171.
Elder, supra note 31, at 431.
172.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 44–45 (“It is clear from the very text of the
ICWA, not to mention its legislative history and the hearings that led to
its enactment, that Congress was concerned with the rights of Indian families
and Indian communities vis-a-vis state authorities.”).
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protecting the best interests of Indian children and families.173
The Court concluded that the unique relationship of Indian
children with their tribe necessitated that the tribal interest be
represented in custody proceedings.174 The dissent, in contrast,
minimized the tribal interests at play and focused primarily on
the rights of the parents.175 The dissent characterized the
purpose of the statute as solely to prevent unjustified removal
of Indian children from their parents, downplaying tribal
sovereignty as only having sway over “the domestic relations of
tribe members.”176 Thus in this situation, where the Indian
child’s parents consented to an adoption and wished to use state
court, the dissent concluded that tribal jurisdiction should not
be granted.177
Prior to 2015, practically no ICWA cases were filed in
federal court and the vast majority of challenges to the statute
developed in state courts.178 Recently, however, the landscape
173.
See id. at 49 (“Congress was concerned not solely about the interests
of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes
themselves of the large number of Indian children adopted by non-Indians.”).
Scholars have suggested that the Court’s acknowledgement of such a deep
tribal interest supports a more political understanding of the term “Indian.”
See, e.g., Elder, supra note 31, at 431 (“[Tribal] emphasis is consistent with a
broader view of the ICWA as part of a larger body of Indian regulations
designed to protect the unique political status of tribes.”).
174.
See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 52 (“This relationship between Indian
tribes and Indian children domiciled on the reservation finds no parallel in
other ethnic cultures found in the United States.” (quoting In re Adoption of
Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969 (Utah 1982))).
175.
See id. at 57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Act gives Indian tribes
certain rights, not to restrict the rights of parents of Indian children, but to
complement and help effect them.”). The dissent emphasizes “the Act also
reflects a recognition that allowing the tribe to defeat the parents’ deliberate
choice of jurisdiction would be conducive neither to the best interests of the
child nor to the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.” Id. at 60.
176.
Id. at 58.
177.
Scholars view this minimization of the role of the tribe to effectively
remove the ICWA from the context of other Indian regulations designed to
ensure self-government. See Elder, supra note 31, at 431 (noting that in this
sense, the term “Indian” becomes “more of a racial classification, and the Act
a remedial legislation targeted towards protecting parents with Indian
heritage”).
178.
See Kathryn Fort & Adrian T. Smith, Indian Child Welfare Act
Annual Case Law Update and Commentary, 2 AM. INDIAN L.J. 32, 41 (2018)
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has been changing.179 After the Baby Girl decision, the
Goldwater Institute180 filed a class action lawsuit in the District
Court of Arizona.181 The Complaint claimed that many of the
ICWA’s key provisions were unconstitutional under the Fifth
Amendment and portrayed the statute as racially
discriminatory.182 The plaintiffs juxtaposed the ICWA with
what they termed “race-neutral” child custody laws and used
the phrase “ancestry” repeatedly to suggest the racial nature of
the classification.183 The Complaint was later dismissed for lack
of standing,184 and vacated as moot by the Ninth Circuit with no
discussion of the merits.185 The National Council for Adoption
brought a similar claim in federal court in Virginia in 2015,

(suggesting recent challenges to the ICWA in federal court “represent a shift
in litigation strategy” as federal courts rarely hear child welfare cases). For a
discussion of state courts’ approaches to constitutional challenges to the
ICWA, see infra notes 192–199 and accompanying text.
179.
See Fort & Smith, supra note 178, at 41 (commenting that the recent
set of federal ICWA cases have been brought by “a coalition of anti-Indian law
groups” and have become “problematic” as the constitutional arguments
proposed at the federal level are “leaking into state ICWA cases”).
180.
The Goldwater Institute is a conservative and libertarian think tank
in Arizona founded in 1988 by Senator Barry Goldwater. About the Goldwater
Institute, GOLDWATER INST., https://perma.cc/3REB-Q8SX.
181.
See Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, Washburn, No. 2:15-cv-01259 (D. Ariz. July 6, 2015)
[hereinafter Complaint].
182.
See id. at 21 (“The [ICWA provisions in question] create[] a separate
set of procedures for children with Indian ancestry and all other children based
solely on the child’s race.”). The first paragraphs of the Complaint include
multiple allusions and citations to famous civil rights cases. Id. at 2.
(“Children with Indian ancestry, however, are still living in the era of Plessy
v. Ferguson . . . .”).
183.
See id. at 21–23. For a complete analysis of the Goldwater Institute’s
litigation approach and racial characterization of the ICWA, see Elder, supra
note 31, at 434–37 (discussing the Complaint and how the plaintiffs are likely
trying to build on Justice Alito’s understanding the ICWA in the Baby Girl
case).
184.
See A.D. v. Washburn, No. 2:15-cv-01259, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
38060 at *33 (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2017) (dismissing the Complaint for lack of
standing).
185.
See Carter v. Tahsuda, 743 Fed. App’x 823, 825 (9th Cir. 2018)
(vacating the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of standing and
remanding with instructions to the district court to dismiss the action as
moot), cert. denied, Carter v. Sweeney, 139 S. Ct. 3637 (2019).
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which was also eventually dismissed.186 In 2017, the Goldwater
Institute joined in an attempt to appeal a state court case in
California187 to first the California Supreme Court and then,
when that failed,188 to the United States Supreme Court. The
Goldwater Institute urged the Supreme Court to address the
constitutionality of what the petition called “ICWA’s
Separate-and-Substandard Legal Scheme.”189 Citing the Court’s
use of the term “ancestor” in Baby Girl, the petition emphasized
the potential unconstitutionality of the ICWA being “triggered
solely by the DNA in [children’s] blood.”190 The Court denied
certiorari.191
Due to the ICWA’s structure as a federal law, which state
administrative and judicial bodies must follow and enforce, the
majority of ICWA case law exists as state court decisions.192
Though the statute’s constitutionality has faced numerous state
trial court challenges, very few have been successful at an

186.
See Nat’l Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 (E.D.
Va. 2015) (dismissing as moot). Another case, filed in Minnesota in 2015,
challenged a state ICWA law. See Doe v. Piper, No. 15-2639, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 124308, at *14 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2017) (granting summary judgment
to Defendants and dismissing the action as moot).
187.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Renteria v. Superior Court, No. 17-789
(Nov. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Petition]. The case was originally brought in
federal court but was later transferred to state court due to lack of jurisdiction.
See Renteria v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, No.
2:16-cv-1685-MCE-AC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119394, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept.
2, 2016) (dismissing constitutionality claim for lack of jurisdiction).
188.
See Renteria v. Superior Court, No. S243352, 2017 Cal. LEXIS 6801,
at *1 (Cal. Aug. 30, 2017) (denying certiorari).
189.
See Petition, supra note 187, at 19 (“Assuming ICWA does apply as a
statutory matter, the constitutional problems created by treating children
differently on the basis of race are of pressing concern—and must be addressed
by this Court.”).
190.
Petition, supra note 187, at 23 (citing Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
570 U.S. 637, 690 (2013)).
191.
See Renteria v. Superior Court, 138 S. Ct. 986 (2018) (denying
certiorari).
192.
See Fort & Smith, supra note 178, at 33 (describing how state court
decisions often have influence beyond the state in which they are decided
because state courts often look to “sister jurisdictions” when applying the
statute due to it being a federal law applied across all states).
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appellate level.193 Several state supreme courts have affirmed
the constitutionality of the ICWA’s classifications under the
Equal Protection Clause, including Maine,194 South Dakota,195
and North Dakota.196
California appellate courts disagree on the issue, with the
Second Appellate District upholding constitutional challenges
to the ICWA as applied to “children whose biological parents do
not have a significant social, cultural or political relationship
with an Indian [tribe].”197 That court again, seven years later,
193.
See, e.g., S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569, 576 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017)
(rejecting the constitutional challenge), cert denied sub nom., 138 S. Ct. 380;
In re N.B., 199 P.3d 16, 22–23 (Colo. App. 2007) (same); In re Armell, 550
N.E.2d 1060, 1067–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (same); In re Application of Angus,
655 P.2d 208, 213 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (emphasizing that the United States
Supreme Court has “consistently rejected claims that laws that treat Indians
as a distinct class violate equal protection”); In re Miller, 451 N.W.2d 576, 579
(Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (following the Oregon Court of Appeals’ reasoning in
Angus and holding that the ICWA does not deny equal protection to
non-Indians); In re Adoption of Child of Indian Heritage, 529 A.2d 1009, 1010
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (noting that the ICWA has been held
constitutional), aff’d, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988); In re Guardianship of L., 291
N.W.2d 278, 281 (S.D. 1980) (rejecting the equal protection challenge); In re
Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d 313, 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (stating that the
ICWA’s differential treatment of Indians is based not on race but on political
status and the quasi-sovereign nature of the tribe).
194.
See In re Marcus S., 638 A.2d 1158, 1159 (Me. 1994) (finding the
ICWA to be constitutional and taking pains to note the special status of
Indians “stemming from the historical relationship between the United States
and a sovereign indigenous people”).
195.
See In re Guardianship of L., 291 N.W.2d at 281 (stating that the
ICWA’s preferences are based solely upon the political status of the parents
and children and the quasi-sovereign nature of the tribe and does not
constitute “invidious racial discrimination”).
196.
See In re A.B., 663 N.W.2d 625, 636 (N.D. 2003) (finding the ICWA to
be constitutional after applying the rational basis standard due to the
“political” nature of the classifications made in the statute).
197.
In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The
court in In re Bridget R. explained that the ICWA should not be applied to
children who live in families without social, cultural, or political relationships
to a federally recognized Indian tribe. Id. at 527. If such relationships did not
exist, the court stated, the only remaining basis for applying the ICWA
becomes, “the child’s genetic heritage—in other words, race.” Id. Other
California appellate districts disagree with this “existing Indian family
exception” to the ICWA. See, e.g., In re Vincent M., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321, 335
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“There is no equal protection violation in the application
of the ICWA’s provisions to Indian children, even where those children are not
part of an existing Indian family.”). The heated discussion regarding the
existing Indian family exception is beyond the scope of this Note.
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upheld a constitutional challenge to the ICWA as applied to a
child with “no association with the Tribe other than genetics,
i.e., his one-quarter ‘Minnesota Chippewa blood’ from an
enrolled bloodline of the Tribe.”198 However, commentators and
scholars have criticized this line of decisions as imposing
superficial requirements that Indians “prove” their Indianness
in order to be deemed somehow worthy of the ICWA’s
protections.199
V.
A.

The Current Setting

Brackeen I—The District Court Case

The issue of equal protection under the ICWA took center
stage in a decision by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas in the fall of 2018. Brackeen v.
Zinke,200 written by Judge Reed O’Connor, applied strict
scrutiny to the statute based on a determination that the term
“Indian” in Section 1904 was a race-based classification.201
The plaintiffs in Brackeen I included the states of Texas,
Louisiana, and Indiana, along with several non-Indian
individuals attempting to adopt Indian children (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”).202 The Plaintiffs contested the constitutionality of
the ICWA under the equal protection requirement of the Fifth

198.
See In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(affirming Bridget R., and emphasizing that an application of ICWA triggered
by an Indian child’s genetic heritage, “without substantial social, cultural or
political affiliations between the child’s family and a tribal community, is an
application based solely . . . upon race and is subject to strict scrutiny” (citing
In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. at 528)).
199.
See Name of the Child, supra note 82, at 333–36 (characterizing In re
Bridget R. as inconsistent with state and federal jurisprudence); Carole
Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373, 1388 (2002) (arguing that
to insist that Indian people demonstrate a certain level of affiliation with their
tribes imposes “non-Indian understandings of Indianness and of
organizational belonging onto the realities of tribal members” and is a
consequence of the continued racialization of tribal membership).
200.
338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018) [hereinafter Brackeen I].
201.
See id. at 534 (“Because the ICWA relies on racial classification, it
must survive strict scrutiny.”).
202.
See id. at 519 (identifying plaintiffs).
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Amendment.203 The defendants included several federal
agencies and four intervening Indian tribes—the Cherokee
Nation, the Oneida Nation, Quinalt Indian Nation, and
Morengo Band of Mission Indians (“Defendants”).204 The
Defendants argued that the ICWA did not violate the equal
protection requirement because the statute “distinguishe[d]
children based on political categories” instead of racial.205
The district court ultimately found “Indian” to be a racial
classification based on its interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent “focused on American Indians and other native
peoples.”206 The court relied primarily on Rice and Mancari to
unpack the differences between classifications based on race
versus those based on tribal membership.207 The Plaintiffs
contended that Rice controlled on the grounds that the ICWA,
like the statute in Rice, allegedly utilized ancestry as a proxy for
a racial classification.208 The Defendants countered that
Mancari and Indian case law suggested that the classification
of Indians is “based on political characteristics.”209 The court
agreed with Plaintiffs that the classification in the ICWA
“mirrors the impermissible racial classification in Rice”210 due
primarily to the inclusion in the definition of any child who “is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe.”211 The court saw this
203.
See id. at 530 (enumerating Plaintiffs’ claims). Plaintiffs also moved
for summary judgment on several other claims beyond the scope of this Note.
They claimed that:
[T]he ICWA and the Final Rule violate: (1) the equal protection
requirements of the Fifth Amendment; (2) the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment; (3) the Tenth Amendment; and (4) the
proper scope of the Indian Commerce Clause. Plaintiffs also argue
that: (1) the Final Rule violates the Administrative Procedure Act
(the “APA”); and (2) the ICWA violates Article I of the Constitution.
Id. Only the Fifth Amendment equal protection claim will be analyzed in this
Note.
204.
See id. at 519 (identifying defendants).
205.
Id. at 531.
206.
Id.
207.
See supra Part III (explicating Rice and Mancari in detail).
208.
See Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 531 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (explaining
the parties’ arguments).
209.
Id.
210.
Id. at 533.
211.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
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eligibility expansion as equivalent to an ancestral requirement
analogous to the Rice statute restricting voting only to “native
Hawaiians and those with Hawaiian ancestry.”212 The court
interpreted Rice as mandating that such ancestral
classifications are unconstitutional as they can be used as a
“proxy for race.”213
Simultaneously, the court found the ICWA’s classification
to be “legally and factually distinguishable from the political
classification in Mancari.”214 The court stated that the
preference in Mancari only applied to “members of federally
recognized tribes,” as opposed to those merely eligible for
membership.215 The court stated that, by expanding the
standard to children eligible for tribal membership, the ICWA
had created a “blanket exemption for Indians”216 which the
statute in Mancari avoided by limiting its jurisdiction to
“members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities.”217 The court
emphasized how Mancari’s decision was “uniquely tailored to
that particular set of facts.”218 The court also narrowed the
Mancari decision by pointing out that the preference there
afforded “special treatment only to Indians living on or near
reservations.”219 The court concluded that Mancari did not
“announce that all arguably racial preferences involving

212.
Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 533 (“[The ICWA’s definition of “Indian
child”] means one is an Indian child if the child is related to a tribal ancestor
by blood.”).
213.
Id. at 534. (noting how the Supreme Court in Rice stated that “racial
discrimination is that which singles out ‘identifiable classes of
persons . . . solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.’” (quoting
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 515 (2000))).
214.
Id. at 533.
215.
Id. (emphasizing that the narrow Mancari definition excludes many
individuals who are racially classified as “Indians” but are not part of a
federally recognized tribe).
216.
Id. (explaining how Mancari noted that a “blanket exemption for
Indians” in a statute would “raise the difficult issue of racial preferences”).
217.
Id. at 532.
218.
See id. (stating that “the Indian preference statute [at issue in
Mancari] is a specific provision applying to a very specific situation” (citing
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974))).
219.
Id.

448

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 411 (2021)

Indians are actually political preferences” but ruled narrowly in
a distinguishable situation.220
After determining the classification to be racial, the court
applied strict scrutiny and analyzed whether the ICWA was
“narrowly tailored to further a compelling government
interest.”221 The court concluded that the Defendants failed to
offer a compelling governmental interest for the statute.222 Next,
the court evaluated whether the ICWA was narrowly tailored.223
The court found the ICWA to be broader than necessary because
it “[(1)] establishes standards that are unrelated to specific
tribal interests224 and [(2)] applies those standards to potential
Indian children.”225 The court stated that the ICWA’s
preferences burden more children than necessary to accomplish
“the [government’s] goal of ensuring children remain with their
tribes.”226 On the basis of these conclusions, the court granted
summary judgment to the Plaintiffs on their equal protection
claim.227
B.

Brackeen II—Fifth Circuit Opinion

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
heard the case on appeal in the summer of 2019. In Brackeen v.

220.

Id. at 533.
Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003)).
222.
See id. at 534 (discussing how the Defendants did not “prove—or
attempt to prove—why the ICWA survives strict scrutiny”).
223.
Id. at 535 (evaluating if the statute is over or underinclusive by
asking if it “covers too many—or too few—people to achieve its stated
purpose”).
224.
Id. (explaining that the preferences are unrelated to specific tribal
interests because they prioritize a child’s placement with any Indian,
regardless of whether that child is eligible for membership in that person’s
tribe).
225.
Id. (explaining that applying the preferences to many children who
will never become members of any Indian tribe does not maintain the Indian
child’s relationship with his or her tribe).
226.
Id. at 536 (noting that the classification applies to “potential Indian
children, including those who will never be members of their ancestral tribe,
those who will ultimately be placed with non-tribal family members, and those
who will be adopted by members of other tribes”).
227.
See id. (“This blanket classification . . . fails to survive strict scrutiny
review. For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment on their Equal Protection Claim is GRANTED.”).
221.
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Bernhardt,228 a three-judge panel for the Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court decision, finding the ICWA to be constitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause.229 The panel concluded that
the ICWA’s use of the term “Indian child” serves as a political
classification that is “rationally related to the fulfillment of
Congress’s unique obligation toward Indians.”230 In November
2019, the Fifth Circuit vacated the panel’s opinion and issued
an order for a rehearing en banc.231 The court heard oral
arguments in January 2020 and issued a divided, lengthy
opinion on April 6, 2021.232 The en banc majority affirmed the
panel’s finding of the “Indian child” designation to be
constitutional on similar grounds.233
The en banc majority began by ascertaining whether
“Indian child” was a race-based or political classification in
order to determine what level of scrutiny to apply.234 The court
acknowledged the political, plenary power Congress has
exercised over tribal relations throughout history.235 The court
noted that legislation often gives special treatment to some

228.

Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 441 (5th Cir. 2019).
See id. (“[W]e REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Plaintiffs and RENDER judgment in favor of Defendants on all
claims.”). It should be noted that, much like in the district court, Plaintiffs
brought several other claims that are beyond the scope of this Note. All claims,
including the equal protection one, were rejected by the Fifth Circuit. Id.
230.
Id.
231.
See generally Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 942 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2019).
232. Brackeen v. Haaland, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at
*7 (5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2021) [hereinafter Brackeen II]. The court addressed
several issues including standing, equal protection, anticommandeering, the
non-delegation doctrine, and Administrative Procedure Act violations. Id. at
*7–10. Only the equal protection discussion falls within the scope of this Note.
229.

233. Id. at 221 (holding the “Indian child” designation to “not offend equal
protection principles because [it is] based on a political classification and [is]
rationally related to the fulfillment of Congress’s unique obligation toward
Indians”).
234.
See id. at *156–57 (laying out a level of scrutiny analysis revolving
around the key question of what kind of classification terms such as “Indian
child,” “Indian family,” and “Indian foster home” are in the ICWA).
235.
See id. at *166–67 (classifying the historical, formal relationship
between the U.S. government and American Indian tribes as “political, rather
than race-based” (quoting COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§ 4.01[1][a] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012)).
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subset of tribal Indians without singling out Indians as a race.236
The court echoed the Mancari opinion, underscoring that, “[i]f
these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly
designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial
discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25
U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment
of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”237
The court unpacked Mancari and found the case controlling
due to the special legal status of Indian tribes under federal
law.238 In analogizing the two cases, the court disagreed with
the district court’s narrow construction of Mancari.239 First, the
court challenged the idea that Mancari’s “blessing of special
treatment for Indians” is limited to laws directed at Indian
self-government.240 Moreover, the court found the ICWA
directly furthered tribal self-government due to the essential
role children play in the continued existence of tribes.241 Second,
with regard to the ICWA covering children merely eligible for
tribal membership, the court explained that “[t]hough the
district court made much of the fact that a child’s tribal
eligibility generally turns on having a blood relationship with a
tribal ancestor, this does not equate to a proxy for race . . . .”242
The court reviewed the history of tribal recognition and its
politicization over time.243 In this context, the court concluded,
236.
See id. at *157 (“The Supreme Court’s decisions ‘leave no doubt that
federal legislation with respect to Indian tribes . . . is not based upon
impermissible racial classification.’” (quoting United States v. Antelope, 430
U.S. 641, 645 (1977))).
237.
Id. (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974)).
238.
See id. at *158 (emphasizing Mancari’s focus on the unique plenary
power of Congress to legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes).
239.
See supra notes 215–219 and accompanying text (narrowing the
applicability of Mancari because the Mancari statute applied (1) “only to
Indians living on or near reservations” and (2) relied on “actual tribal
membership”).
240.
See Brackeen II, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *161 (“Mancari—and
its progeny—confirm that classifications relating to Indians need not be
specifically directed at Indian self-government to be considered political
classifications . . . .”).
241. See id. at *162–64 (considering Congressional findings on the
importance of retention of Indian children to long-term tribal survival).
242.
Id. at *166.
243. Id. at *167 (“Though inevitably tied in part to ancestry, tribal
recognition and tribal sovereignty center on a group's status as a continuation
of a historical political entity.”).
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the ICWA is simply applied “on the basis of a child’s connection
to a political entity based on whatever criteria that political
entity may prescribe.”244 Additionally, the court added,
including children eligible for membership, “embraces Indian
children who possess a potential but not-yet-formalized
affiliation with a current political entity—a federally recognized
tribe.”245
The Fifth Circuit also examined the district court’s analysis
of Rice and rejected the district court’s conclusion that the ICWA
presented a similar “impermissible racial classification.”246 To
parse out the crucial differences in Rice and Mancari, the court
first examined the Supreme Court’s reasons for determining the
Hawaiian voting statute’s definition to be a racially based
classification.247 The court noted that the Rice majority focused
on the fact that native Hawaiians do not enjoy a protected status
akin to that of members of federally recognized tribes.248 This
overarching discrepancy between the groups, combined with the
statute’s classification of citizens based solely on their ancestry,
244.
See id. at *168–69 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49, 72 n.32 (1978)). It is worth noting that the Fifth Circuit panel opinion
highlighted the consistency of using a political classification with its decision
in Peyote Way Church of God Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.
1991). See Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 428 (5th Cir. 2019). In both
Peyote Way and Mancari, a court refused to find a law directed at a subgroup
of Indians to be a race-based classification necessitating strict scrutiny. Peyote
Way, 922 F.2d at 1212; Mancari, 417 U.S. at 550. Mancari upheld a hiring
preference statute that applied only to individuals who were a member of a
federal recognized tribe and had “one-fourth or more degree Indian blood.”
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. Similarly, in Peyote Way, the Fifth Circuit used
Mancari to uphold a statute allowing for possession of peyote on the basis that
members of the Indian church who used the peyote are “limited to Native
American members of federally recognized tribes who have at least 25%
Native American ancestry . . . .” Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1212. The panel
concluded that the ICWA’s classification similarly turns, “at least in part, on
whether the child is eligible for membership in a federally recognized tribe.”
Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 428.
245.
Brackeen II, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *171 (5th
Cir. Apr. 6, 2021) (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24).
246.
Id. at *169 (quoting Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 533 (N.D. Tex.
2018)).
247.
See id. at *169–70 (examining the Supreme Court’s determination
that the statute classified citizens “solely because of their ancestry”).
248.
See id. at *171 (citing Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 522 (2000))
(examining the majority opinion’s rationale).
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led the Supreme Court to conclude that the legislature’s purpose
was to use the term “ancestry” as a proxy for race.249
With the Supreme Court’s analysis in mind, the Fifth
Circuit distinguished Rice from Brackeen I for several reasons.
First, the court noted that, unlike Rice’s facts, the ICWA’s
classification of “Indian child” would not exclude whole classes
of a state’s citizens from decision-making in state affairs.250
Additionally, unlike the Rice statute, the ICWA’s classification
does not single out children solely because of their ancestry.251
Perhaps most importantly, the Rice opinion was acutely aware
that native Hawaiians do not enjoy the same unique protections
as Indians under federal law.252 The voter eligibility law in Rice
lacked the context of Congress’ lengthy history of federal
regulation with Indian tribes, making it clearly distinguishable
from the ICWA.253 The Fifth Circuit determined that because
Rice was distinguishable and Mancari controlling, the ICWA’s
definition of “Indian child” was “a political classification subject
to rational basis review.”254
After determining the standard of review, the court easily
concluded that the special treatment of Indian children under
the ICWA can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’
unique obligation toward the Indians, due to the statute’s stated
purpose of protecting Indian children while promoting the

249. See id. at *170 (noting that, in reaching this conclusion, “the Rice
Court expressly reaffirmed Mancari’s central holding that, because
classifications based on Indian tribal membership are ‘not directed towards a
“racial” group consisting of “Indians,”’ but instead apply ‘only to members of
“federally recognized” tribes,’ they are ‘political rather than racial in nature’”
(citing Rice, 528 U.S. at 519–20)).
250.
See id. (explaining how Rice involved voter eligibility in a state-wide
election for a state agency and thus did not even violate equal protection but
only the Fifteenth Amendment).
251.
See id. at *172 (“But unlike the ancestral requirement in Rice,
ICWA's eligibility standard simply recognizes that some Indian children have
an imperfect or inchoate tribal membership.”) (quoting Rice, 528 U.S. at 515).
252.
See id. at *171 (emphasizing how tribal members are “constituents of
quasi-sovereign political communities”).
253.
See id. at *171–72 (underscoring that, in drafting the ICWA,
Congress was recognizing “the realities of tribal membership and classifying
based on a child's status as a member or potential member of a quasi-sovereign
political entity, regardless of his or her ethnicity”).
254.
Id. at *172.
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stability and security of the Indian tribes.255 The en banc
majority also dismissed arguments that the ICWA
impermissibly intrudes into state proceedings.256 Based on its
finding of a political classification warranting rational basis
review, the Fifth Circuit did not consider the viability of the
district court’s strict scrutiny analysis.257
C.

Analyzing the Correct Approach to Equal Protection in the
ICWA

This section of the Note will evaluate whether the district
court or the Fifth Circuit correctly determined the appropriate
standard of review by which to evaluate the ICWA. This decision
hinges on which court correctly identified the nature of the
classification of the term “Indian child.” Many scholars side with
the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion on the grounds that the term
“Indian” is a political, rather than racial category.258 On the
other hand, critics of the ICWA agree with the district court’s
conclusion that the classification is racial and apply strict
scrutiny.259 As detailed below, the Fifth Circuit’s approach is the
best approach. The term “Indian” as a political classification is
supported by the historical and social context of the ICWA, the
255.
See id. at *174–75 (reiterating the circumstances giving rise to the
ICWA and determining “Indian child” to be a political classification which
passes rational basis review and does not violate equal protection).
256. See id. at *175–77 (arguing that any such intrusion would have “no
bearing on whether that law is rationally linked to protecting Indian tribes[,]”
and to hold otherwise would be to incorrectly apply a strict scrutiny standard
to the statute). As to the other judges’ concerns about over- and
under-inclusiveness of the ICWA, the majority reiterated that “[r]ational basis
review tolerates overinclusive classifications, underinclusive ones, and other
imperfect means-ends fits.” Id. at *180 (citations omitted).
257.
See id. (omitting any discussion of whether the statute would pass
strict scrutiny).
258.
See, e.g., Elder, supra note 31, at 419 (arguing that the term “Indian”
should be interpreted as a political classification due to the historical context
of Indians in the United States and a manifest congressional intent to protect
tribes as political units through the ICWA); see also supra Part III.B
(explicating precedent for “Indian” as a political classification).
259.
See Timothy Sandefur, Recent Developments in Indian Child Welfare
Act Litigation: Moving Toward Equal Protection?, 23 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 425,
430–31 (2019) (applauding the Brackeen I decision and contending that the
ICWA indeed “falls on the racial, rather than the political, side of the
[Rice/Mancari] division”).

454

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 411 (2021)

ICWA’s place within a larger body of federal Indian regulation,
and the application of Supreme Court precedent in non-ICWA
Indian law equal protection cases. Thus, correct application of
precedent shows rational basis to be the proper standard of
review for the ICWA.
Both Brackeen opinions focus their discussion on the correct
application of Mancari and Rice.260 Brackeen I distinguished
Mancari based on the ICWA’s inclusion of children (1) merely
eligible for tribal membership and (2) living off Indian
reservations.261 Brackeen II disagreed with this narrow
construction of Mancari and challenged both of these points in
turn.262 As for geographic limitations, the Fifth Circuit correctly
determined that extensive precedent supports the precept that
federal laws can apply to Indians no matter their physical
location.263 Such power is derived from the U.S. Constitution’s
Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the authority “to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with Indian tribes.”264 As such, Mancari’s holding
does not depend on the individuals at issue being physically on
a reservation.265
The tougher question for the courts, and the question at the
heart of the constitutional issue, is whether the ICWA’s
definition of “Indian child” can constitutionally be extended to
children who are not enrolled tribal members yet are eligible for
membership and have a tribal citizen for a biological parent. The
260.
See supra notes 109–126 and accompanying text (explicating Mancari
opinion in detail); supra notes 145–162 and accompanying text (explicating
Rice opinion in detail).
261.
See supra notes 214–220 and accompanying text (explicating
Brackeen I opinion).
262.
See supra notes 237–Error! Bookmark not defined. and
accompanying text (explicating the Brackeen II opinion’s analysis of the
application of Mancari to the case at bar).
263.
See, e.g., United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938)
(“Congress possesses the broad power of legislating for the protection of the
Indians wherever they may be within the territory of the United States.”
(citing United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 471 (1926))); Perrin v. United
States, 232 U.S. 478, 482 (1914) (acknowledging Congress’ power to regulate
Indians “whether on or off a reservation and whether within or without the
limits of a state”).
264.
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
265.
Brackeen II, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *165–66
(5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2021) (noting that not even the preference in Mancari
required that the Indians benefiting live on or near a reservation).
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district court emphasized that Mancari’s statute applied a
preference only to current members of federally recognized
tribes.266 In contrast, the district court saw the ICWA’s
expansive definition, including children merely eligible for
tribal membership, as an ancestrally or race-based
classification, different than Mancari’s political classification
which depended on individuals actually being enrolled
members.267 However, the tribal eligibility requirement is not a
racial classification, based purely on ancestry or blood.
The statute in Mancari required not only tribal
membership, but also that an individual be at least one-quarter
“Indian blood.”268 This blood quantum provision differs from the
ICWA, which depends solely on the tribe’s individual criteria for
membership and does not explicitly impose any blood quantum
requirement.269 Therefore, the case for racial discrimination “is
even weaker regarding the ICWA, since the legislation itself is
silent on bloodlines.”270 If the Supreme Court went so far as to
designate the Mancari statute, with an explicit blood quantum
provision, a non-racial classification, then “the ICWA certainly
is an expression of ‘Congress’ unique obligation toward the
Indians’ as tribes, rather than race-based legislation.”271

266.
See Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 533 (N.D. Tex. 2018)
(maintaining that the narrow Mancari definition excludes many individuals
who are racially classified as “Indians” but are not part of a federally
recognized tribe).
267.
See id. at 533–34 (“By deferring to tribal membership eligibility
standards based on ancestry, rather than actual tribal affiliation, the ICWA’s
jurisdictional definition of “Indian children” uses ancestry as a proxy for race
and therefore [receives strict scrutiny].”).
268.
See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (explaining that
to be eligible for preference “an individual must be one-fourth or more degree
Indian blood and be a member of a Federally-recognized tribe”).
269.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
270.
See Elder, supra note 31, at 428 (differentiating requiring the
individual to be the “biological child of a member of an Indian tribe” and
requiring certain bloodlines, due to the fact that the parent is merely required
to be a tribe member, not to meet a specified blood quantum).
271.
Elder, supra note 31, at 429 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 555 (1974)).
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The concept of using blood quantum is not new in the
context of federal Indian legislation.272 However, since the early
1970s, Congress has gone to great lengths to define “Indian” as
a citizen of a tribe as opposed to a percentage of a blood
quantum.273 Along with the Indian Land Consolidation Act,274
the Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Protection
Act,275 the Indian Employment, Training and Related Services
Act,276 and the Indian Health Care Improvement Act,277 the
ICWA is another example of the paradigm of a new era—one
where Congress recognizes the term “Indian” as a “political
designation of citizenship,” as defined by each tribe, instead of
a racial identity.278
Undoubtably, Congress’s approach since the 1970s
reinforces and protects a more accurate reflection of what tribes
themselves view as the nature of their membership eligibility
requirements.279 Like the United States, tribes often extend
citizenship to the children of citizen parents, passing the
parents’ “willful political relationship” with the tribe on to the

272.
See Fain & Nagle, supra note 165, at 803 (revealing that, during the
Termination Era of 1870–1950, the government enforced policies requiring a
minimum blood quantum before federal law would recognize an individual as
a citizen of a Tribal Nation).
273.
See id. at 850 (providing the example of the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 which “completed
the shift away from using a minimum blood quantum” by defining “Indian” as
“a person who is a member of an Indian tribe”).
274.
25 U.S.C. § 2201 (passed in 1983).
275.
Id. §§ 3201–02 (passed in 1990).
276.
Id. § 3401 (passed in 1992).
277.
Id. § 1601(5) (passed in 1976).
278.
Fain & Nagle, supra note 165, at 851–53; see John Robert Renner,
The Indian Child Welfare Act and Equal Protection Limitations on the Federal
Power over Indian Affairs, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 129, 141 (1992) (“[B]y the
late 1960s the policy again shifted—with the beginning of the present period.
The new emphasis was and remains on tribal self-determination.”).
279.
Brief for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in
Oklahoma as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant at 14, Brackeen v.
Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Brief for Cherokee
Indians in Oklahoma] (“Citizenship in a Tribal Nation, however, is not
contingent on “ancestry,” but rather hinges on an individual’s contemporary
political relationship with a sovereign nation.”).
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next generation.280 In the present litigation, the Indian tribes
argue that this concept of citizenship is central to determining
that the ICWA’s classification of “Indian child” turns on whether
a child has a political affiliation to a certain tribe.281 Tribes have
long held themselves out as separate sovereign bodies with
exclusive requirements for membership.282 Race can play a role
in eligibility, but is not necessarily determinative depending on
the tribe.283 The ICWA requires both that a child (1) be eligible
for tribal membership, as defined by individual tribes’ laws, and
(2) have at least one biological parent who is a member of a
tribe.284 Factor two, the political affiliation of a biological parent
to a tribe, is also relevant to whether the ICWA applies to a
child.285 Thus, race or ancestry is simply one factor of the child’s
tribal membership eligibility, which in turn is one factor of the
child’s eligibility to be classified as an “Indian child” under the
ICWA. Using race as a factor within a factor does not make the
entire classification race-based, especially within the highly
political context of Indian federal tribe citizenship.286
By muddling the concepts of citizenship and ancestry,
Brackeen I misunderstood tribal eligibility standards. Applying
“ancestry” terminology also ignores entire tribes, and existing
280.
See id. at 15 (stating that “just as citizenship in the United States is
not tethered to some identifiable ‘ancestor’ who once lived in the United
States” neither is Tribal Nation citizenship based in ancestry but is a
consequence of a “willful political relationship”).
281.
See Brief of Appellants Cherokee Nation, Oneida Nation, Quinault
Indian Nation, and Morongo Band of Mission Indians at 29, Brackeen v.
Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Brief of Tribal Nations]
(stating the statute’s emphasis is on the child either being a citizen of a
federally recognized tribe or having a parent who is a citizen, thus making the
ICWA “triggered by political affiliation: enrolled membership (or eligibility for
it) in a sovereign nation—not race— . . . .”).
282.
See Thornton, supra note 74, at 106 (explaining that Indian tribes
“won the right to determine their own membership” in the early twentieth
century and now hold complete autonomy over setting tribal membership
standards in their own tribal constitutions).
283.
See id. at 107 (using BIA tribal enrollment data to illustrate that
many tribes in fact have no minimum blood quantum requirement).
284.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
285.
Id.
286.
The Supreme Court showed its willingness to allow race to be a factor
of a factor in the affirmative action case Fisher v. University of Texas, 136 S.
Ct. 2198, 2206–07 (2016).
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constituencies within certain tribes, who have no “Indian
ancestry” whatsoever.287 Several tribes have signed treaties
incorporating non-racially Indian groups into “the body politic
of a Tribal Nation” and, in doing so, recognized citizenship
rights stemming from marriage, adoption, and previously
enslaved groups.288 With this context in mind, attributing a
racial or ancestral definition to tribal citizenship requirements
necessitates a disregard for U.S.-Indian history, federal statutes
and treaties, and the very nature of tribal eligibility criteria.
Additionally, the Mancari decision underscored the
political nature of the term “Indian” within the context of the
relationship of Indian tribes with Congress and the ongoing
desire to promote Indian self-governance.289 It cannot be
disputed that children are quite literally the future of Indian
tribes and their removal from the community directly
undermines any semblance of tribal autonomy.290 The ICWA, as
a congressional response to the destruction of Indian tribes,
embodies the type of legislation necessitated by such a
“guardian-ward” relationship.291 Further, the ICWA directly
promotes tribal autonomy and self-governance by granting
287.
See Brief for Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma, supra note 279, at
15 – 16, Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining how
after the Civil War the United States and the historical Cherokee Nation
signed a treaty to free all slaves in their Nation and that “all freedmen . . . and
their descendants, shall have all the rights of native Cherokees . . . .” (quoting
Treaty With The Cherokee, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nation of Indians, art. 9, July
19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799)). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
recently confirmed that, “the 1886 treaty alone . . . guarantees for qualifying
freedmen the right to citizenship.” Cherokee Nation v. Nash, 267 F. Supp. 3d
86, 123 (D.D.C. 2017).
288.
See Brief for Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma, supra note 279, at 16 – 19
(discussing such practices in the Cherokee Nation, Choctaw Nation,
Chickasaw Nation, Muscogee (Creek) Nation, and Seminole Nation).
289.
See supra notes 115–123 and accompanying text (explicating the
Court’s reasoning).
290.
See, e.g., To Establish Standards for the Placement of Indian Children
in Foster or Adoptive Homes, to Prevent the Breakup of Indian Families, and
for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 95th CONG. 1, 156 (1977) (Statement of Hon. Calvin Isaacs) (noting
that “[r]emoval is generally accomplished without notice to or consultation
with responsible tribal authorities”).
291.
123 CONG. REC. 9980 (1977) (Statement of Sen. Abourezk) (“It is the
responsibility of the Congress to take whatever action is within its power to
see to it that American Indian communities and their families are not
destroyed.”).
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tribes intervention rights in state court proceedings,292 creating
placement preferences for Indian children,293 and, in some cases,
allowing exclusive tribal court jurisdiction.294 Thus, Brackeen II
correctly determined the district court’s interpretation of
Mancari to be far too narrow.295 Instead, including children who
are eligible for tribal membership due to their parents’ tribal
affiliations should be seen not as a proxy for race, but rather as
a standard which “embraces Indian children who possess a
potential but not-yet-formalized affiliation with a [tribe.]”296
Brackeen I also relied heavily on “precedent developed by
the Supreme Court’s review of statutes focused on American
Indians and other native peoples.”297 Already, this statement
encompasses far too broad a scope, as the history of federally
recognized Indian tribes is unique in equal protection
jurisprudence from any other population.298 The district court
claimed that the ICWA, by including in the definition of “Indian
child” children merely eligible for tribal membership, “mirrors
292.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1911I (enumerating tribal courts’ unprecedented
intervention abilities in state court child custody proceedings).
293.
See id. § 1915 (describing the deference given to tribes in Indian
placement preferences for removed children and how tribes can even edit a
child’s preference order via a resolution).
294.
See id. § 1911(a) (explaining that tribal courts shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over certain child custody proceedings involving “an Indian child
who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe”).
295.
It warrants mention that the district court, when limiting the
application of Mancari, heavily emphasized a line from the opinion stating
that the BIA statute “is a specific provision applying to a very specific
situation.” Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 532 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (citing
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)). However, this quotation is taken
out of context and appeared in Mancari during a statutory interpretation
discussion merely to address whether the BIA statute had been implicitly
repealed by the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunities Act. See Morton, 417
U.S. at 550–51 (discussing that “[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise,
a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one”). It has
little bearing on the application of the Mancari precedent on the political
versus racial classification question.
296.
Brackeen II, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *171 (5th
Cir. Apr. 6, 2021) (emphasizing that minors and infants often do not have the
capacity to initiate the formal procedure to join a tribe).
297.
Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 531 (citing Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S.
495 (2000)) (emphasis added).
298.
See supra Parts II–III.
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the impermissible racial classification in Rice.”299 However, the
two classifications are distinguishable for several reasons. As
the Fifth Circuit noted, unlike Rice’s statute, the ICWA
classification does not exclude whole classes of a state’s citizens
from participating in state affairs.300 In contrast, the ICWA
exists to assist judges and state courts in making child custody
decisions for children who were either members of, or were
eligible for membership and had a parent who was a member of,
a semi-sovereign body.301 Unlike elections, which clearly
implicate state courts, Indian child custody matters have more
complex interests at stake, including that of the child, the
parents, the state, the tribe, and the United States.302 Even
before the ICWA, the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of
state judicial systems in Indian child custody proceedings303
within the context of a long historical tradition of Indian tribes
being given semi-sovereign status and enjoying self-autonomy
in the United States.304 Excluding non-native Hawaiians from
voting in a state election outside of the context of Indian

299.

Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 531.
Brackeen II, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *170 (5th
Cir. Apr. 6, 2021) (explaining that Rice involved the sensitive topic of voter
eligibility in a state-wide election for a state agency).
301.
See supra Part II.B (explaining how the ICWA accounts for the
unique nature of semi-sovereign Indian tribes and creates tribal intervention
rules).
302.
Brackeen II, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *178–79 (noting that
while the elections in Rice were clearly state affairs, a state court adoption
proceeding involving an Indian child was “simultaneously affairs of states,
tribes, and Congress” (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3))).
303.
See, e.g., Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387 (1976) (“State-court
jurisdiction plainly would interfere with the powers of self-government
conferred upon the [tribe] and exercised through the Tribal Court.”).
304.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (stating that “Congress shall have the
power . . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes” and thus determining Indian
tribes to be separate from the states and foreign nations); Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 5123 et seq. (allowing Indians to set
up formal tribal councils and courts and encouraging tribal autonomy); see also
Michalyn Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in
Indian Affairs, 63 UCLA L. REV. 666, 670 (2016) (exploring the legal paradox
between the Supreme Court’s simultaneous acknowledgement of the plenary
power of Congress over Indian affairs and the endurance of a “critical core of
inherent tribal sovereignty”).
300.

EQUITY OVER EQUALITY

461

jurisprudence is another matter entirely and clearly
distinguishable.305
The Rice opinion itself emphasized that native Hawaiians
do not have a protected status akin to that of Indian tribes.306
Brackeen II found that the law in Rice lacked the contextual
history of Congress’s lengthy engagement with regulating
Indian tribes.307 Precedent suggests that the principles of
self-autonomy and the assumption of a “guardian-ward” status
only apply in the context of federally recognized Indian tribes,
not all native peoples.308 Thus, the Rice court’s holding that the
exclusion of native Hawaiians was unconstitutional cannot
serve as a roadmap by which to judge the constitutionality of
the ICWA as it relates to federally recognized Indian tribes and
their members.
D.

An Alternative Path Forward

Even if a court determined that the term “Indian” in the
ICWA was indeed a suspect racial classification, the statute is
still constitutional under strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires
race-based classifications to have a compelling governmental
purpose and use necessary and narrowly tailored means to
achieve this purpose.309 For the ICWA, like many federal Indian
laws, the compelling purpose stems from the government’s
interest in fulfilling unique responsibilities to federally
305. See Brackeen II, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *179
(“The Rice Court's caution against fencing off a class of citizens from
participation in state affairs thus does not apply to ICWA[.]”).
306.
See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 518 (2000) (stating that no such
comparable status to Indian tribes exists for native Hawaiians); see also
Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting an equal
protection challenge brought by native Hawaiians, who were excluded from
the U.S. Department of the Interior’s regulatory tribal acknowledgement
process and simultaneously concluding that the recognition of Indian tribes
was political).
307.
See Brackeen II, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *178 (describing the
historical discrepancy between native Hawaiians and federally recognized
Indian tribes).
308.
See Part III (surveying cases which emphasize and affirm the deep
notions of sovereignty and self-autonomy that federally recognized Indian
tribes have been granted throughout history by federal courts).
309.
See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text (discussing strict
scrutiny review).
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recognized tribes.310 This interest is based on the “general trust
relationship between the United States and the Indian
people”311 which creates obligations to Indian tribes, holding the
government responsible “for the protection and preservation of
Indian tribes.”312 The ICWA’s two intertwined purposes of
protecting the best interests of Indian children and promoting
the stability and security of Indian tribes both fall within this
overarching trust relationship.313 Granting tribes more
autonomy over Indian child custody proceedings and stopping
unwarranted removals of Indian children from Indian homes
are vital instruments to protect and stabilize the future of
Indian tribes, thereby fulfilling the government’s guardian
role.314 A governmental interest in better protecting Indian
children and tribes remains compelling today, as recent studies
show that the proportion of Indian children in foster care is still
more than twice as high as the proportion of the general
population.315
Further, the Supreme Court has held that the government
may use race-based classifications to respond to the “unhappy
310.
See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974) (noting that
along with Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian
Tribes” comes an obligation of trust to protect the rights and interests of
federally recognized tribes and to promote their self-determination); McAllen
Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 473 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding
“an obligation to protect the interests of federally recognized tribes” to be
compelling under strict scrutiny); United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274,
1284–87 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he interest found compelling arises from the
federal government’s obligations, springing from history and from the text of
the Constitution, to federally-recognized Indian tribes.”); Gibson v. Babbitt,
223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Government has met its
evidentiary burden of proving that it has a compelling governmental interest
in fulfilling its treaty obligations with federally recognized Indian tribes.”).
311.
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (noting that this
principle dominates federal Indian law and creates a fiduciary relationship).
312.
25 U.S.C. § 1901(2).
313.
See id. § 1901; House Report, supra note 8, at 8; see also infra notes
37–42 and accompanying text (positing that the ICWA’s purposes are
interconnected and symbiotic).
314.
See id. (“[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children . . . .”).
315.
Alicia Summers & Steve Wood, Measuring Compliance with the
Indian Child Welfare Act: An Assessment Toolkit, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. &
FAM. CT. JUDGES, 4 (Feb. 28, 2014), https://perma.cc/PJH8-CV8N (PDF)
(stating additionally that many states, such as Minnesota, have “[Indian
foster] care rates more than 10 times the general population rate”).

EQUITY OVER EQUALITY

463

persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial
discrimination against minority groups in this country.”316 The
ICWA is an overt and decisive response to racial discrimination
and systematic bias against Indian families.317 The insensitivity
of state courts and the social welfare systems toward the unique
tribal Indian way of life continues today and leads to the
detrimental treatment of Indian children in child custody
proceedings.318
In Grutter, a case where the Court upheld a statute under
strict scrutiny,319 the Court emphasized its deference to “[t]he
Law School’s educational judgment that . . . diversity is
essential to its educational mission” in finding the admissions
policy’s purpose to be compelling.320 The Court described
educational institutions as “occupy[ing] a special niche in our
constitutional tradition.”321 If the history of Indian law
jurisprudence teaches us anything, it is clear that federally
recognized Indian tribes also occupy a unique “niche” in the
United States’ constitutional tradition.322 In the context of
semi-sovereign Indian tribes, courts have shown extreme
316.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)
(dispelling the notion that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact”
in all circumstances); see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–327 (2003)
(“Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all
are invalidated by it.”).
317.
See 1974 Hearings, supra note 4, at 213–14 (identifying
Euro-American cultural bias as the leading cause of distress to Indian families
and culture, due to a legal system that was depleting tribal populations
deliberately because of “profound prejudice and discrimination” (quoting
statements of Evelyn Blanchard, a BIA social worker)); see also supra Part
II.A (explaining how Congress drafted the ICWA as a direct response to the
staggering number of child removals due to racist treatment of Indian children
and families in state child welfare systems).
318.
See About ICWA, NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N (2020)
(“[R]ecent research on systemic bias in the child welfare system yielded
shocking results. Native families are four times more likely to have their
children removed and placed in foster care than their White counterparts.”).
319.
See supra notes 94–106 and accompanying text (explicating Grutter
in detail).
320.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
321.
Id. at 329.
322.
See supra Part III.B (explicating the Court’s deferential approach to
treatment of Indian tribes as different from non-Indians and focus on
cultivating a unique guardian-ward relationship between the federal
government and such tribes).
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deference to tribes and their ability to exercise self-autonomy.323
Each of the ICWA’s provisions directly furthers one or both of
the statute’s compelling interests. The ICWA promotes tribal
autonomy and self-governance by granting tribal courts both
notice and intervention rights in certain state court
proceedings.324 Similarly, provisions such as the placement
preferences in § 1915 serve the larger compelling purpose of
protecting Indian children by attempting to preserve as many of
the child’s connections as possible within an individualized
framework that allows for customized consideration of each
child’s needs.325
The drafters of the ICWA were careful to use necessary and
narrowly tailored means to achieve these compelling purposes,
crafting a statute with similar properties as the admissions
policy in Grutter. Brackeen I claimed that the ICWA’s definition
of “Indian child” was overinclusive because it encompassed all
“children simply eligible for membership who have a biological
Indian parent.”326 But this misstates the text of the statute,
which applies only to children eligible for membership with a
biological parent who is a “member of an Indian tribe.”327 The
legislative history shows that Congress originally considered,
but ultimately rejected, a broader definition of “Indian child.”328
An earlier draft of the ICWA did not define “Indian child”
specifically, but instead defined “Indian” as “any person who is
a member of or who is eligible for membership in a federally
recognized Indian tribe.”329 The final draft changed this
323.
See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 541 (1974) (finding the BIA
statute’s purpose to be “to give Indians a greater participation in their own
self-government”); Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 5123 et seq.
(proclaiming an “overriding purpose” to foster “a greater degree of
self-government, both politically and economically,” among Indian tribes).
324.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (enumerating tribal court intervention abilities).
325.
See supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text (describing how the
ICWA’s placement preferences aim to serve the BICS in a unique tribal
context).
326.
Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 532 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
327.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
328.
See Nielson v. Ketchum, 640 F.3d 1117, 1123–24 (10th Cir. 2011)
(holding that the ICWA did not cover a child of Indian descent who was eligible
for membership but whose parents were not tribal members because “the final
draft of the statue” limited membership to those children, otherwise eligible,
who had a parent who was a member of a tribe).
329.
Id. at 1124 (citing 123 Cong. Rec. S37223 (1977) (emphasis added)).
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language so as not to include children granted automatic,
temporary membership under certain tribal laws.330 Congress
“did not intend the ICWA to authorize this sort of
gamesmanship,”331 and the drafters excluded this expansive
definition of membership, carefully tailoring the law. The
eligibility language represents a conscious effort by the drafters
to simultaneously ensure that the ICWA is not underinclusive,
as it seeks to protect tribal members and their young children
who have not yet become formally enrolled members.332
In addition to narrowly tailored language, the ICWA, like
Grutter, uses race merely as one factor in determining whether
a child is an “Indian child” under the ICWA.333 The ICWA
requires both that a child be eligible for tribal membership, as
defined by individual tribes’ laws, and have at least one
biological parent who is a member of a tribe.334 Membership
eligibility requirements amongst tribes vary greatly, and race
or ancestry is not the only factor at play.335 Further, the political
affiliation of a biological parent to a federally recognized tribe is
also relevant to whether the ICWA applies to a child.336
Similarly, in Grutter, the Court viewed the holistic nature of the
admissions policy favorably, with race being a mere “plus”
factor, instead of a definitive attribute.337

330.
See, e.g., Nielson, 640 F.3d at 1123–24 (explaining that the Cherokee
Nation Citizenship Act “purports to make newborns who are directly
descended from Dawes enrollees temporary citizens for 240 days following
their birth” even if the child’s parents are not members).
331.
Id. (“[T]he Citizenship Act’s broad definition of citizenship—even if it
was full citizenship as opposed to temporary—violates Congress’ intent.”).
332.
House Report, supra note 8, at 17 (recognizing that extending
protection to minors who are not yet enrolled tribal members is crucial to the
ICWA’s interests and that Congress must “act to protect the valuable rights of
a minor Indian who is eligible [for membership in a tribe]”).
333.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (“Universities can,
however, consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a ‘plus’ factor in the
context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant.”).
334.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
335.
See supra notes 279–283 and accompanying text (explaining the
variety of tribal eligibility standards).
336.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
337.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334–336 (describing how the admissions policy is
constitutional due to its use of race merely as one factor for determining law
school admission).
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Additionally, a court should find that all race-neutral
alternatives were considered before the formation of the ICWA.
In Grutter, the law school argued that the “holistic application”
process was necessary because there was no alternative way to
attract a diverse student body.338 Similarly, here, the legislative
history clearly shows that the desperate plight of Indian
children and their families gave the government little
alternative than to create federal standards unique to Indian
child custody proceedings.339 The standards and values used by
state social workers for non-Indian families were not applicable
to the Indian way of life, and caused unwarranted removal at an
unprecedented rate.340 Current practices were deemed “wholly
inappropriate” by Congress in the context of Indian cultural
values and social norms.341 A carefully tailored statute,
applicable only to tribal Indians and their offspring, was
necessary to take into account the burgeoning “realization that
Native Americans have unique practices and traditions
regarding child-rearing that are not susceptible to judgment
using a non-Indian barometer.”342
Similarly, the enactment of the controversial placement
preferences in § 1915 was absolutely essential in the drafting of
the ICWA given the evidence presented to Congress. Removed
children were often deprived of their identities as Indians, yet
338.
See id. at 333 (“The Law School has determined, based on its
experience and expertise, that a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities
is necessary to further its compelling interest in securing the educational
benefits of a diverse student body.”). The Court was satisfied with the school’s
record of previous failed attempts to increase diversity through race-neutral
alternatives. See id. at 339–40 (describing failed alternatives).
339.
See supra notes 32–42 and accompanying text (describing the
breakdown of the BICS in the context of Indian children and the need for a
more directed approach, better able take into account cultural differences and
tribal concerns).
340.
See Atwood, supra note 28, at 603–04 (explaining how state welfare
officials were insensitive to “traditional Indian approaches to child rearing”
and based the majority of removals on vague categories of “neglect” rather
than any concrete charges); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30, 45 (1989) (“Congress perceived the States and their courts as partly
responsible for the problem it intended to correct.”).
341.
See House Report, supra note 8, at 10 (asserting that social workers’
conclusions regarding Indian children’s emotional risk and Indian parents’
caregiving abilities were often blinded by bias and a lack of respect for deep
cultural differences).
342.
JONES, supra note 22, at 12.
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never fully accepted into their new communities.343 The
preference for placement with Indian families, even those
outside the child’s tribe, serves to actively subscribe to the BICS
in the unique context of Indian children.344 Similarly, the
preference for placement “with other Indian families” is not
overbroad, but instead a recognition that many tribes have deep
historical connections, allowing placement of a child with
members of a connected tribe to further both the ICWA’s goals
by maintaining the child’s relationship with their own tribe.345
Finally, the statute adheres closely to its best interest purpose
by including the flexibility to allow a judge to override the
preferences in the face of “good cause” for each individual
situation.346 This flexibility, embedded in a framework of
carefully calibrated provisions which weigh tribal, state,
federal, and individual interests, narrowly tailors the ICWA’s
provisions to further its compelling governmental interests.

343.
See, e.g., 1974 Hearings, supra note 4, at 46 (“[Indian children raised
in non-Indian communities] were finding that society was putting on them an
identity which they didn’t possess and taking from them an identity that they
did possess.”) (statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer, psychiatrist)). Though
cared for “by devoted and well-intentioned foster or adoptive parents”
adolescent Indians often suffered from “ethnic confusion and a pervasive sense
of abandonment.” Id. at 63 (statement of Dr. Carl Mindell and Dr. Alan
Gurwitt).
344.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (asserting that keeping children within the tribe
is not the sole interest of the ICWA, as the statute also explicitly seeks to
promote the best interests of the children). Careful to not let tribal allegiance
override common knowledge about best interests of children, Congress
recognized that placing Indian children with relatives, regardless of their
tribal connection, can frequently be in their best interest and listed “placement
with a member of the child’s extended family” as the primary placement
preference. Id. § 1915(a); see U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PLACEMENT OF
CHILDREN WITH RELATIVES 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/8SV5-HH94 (PDF)
(finding that placement with relatives is often in the best interest of children).
345.
See Indian Entities, supra note 2, at 1200 (showing that many tribes
today have historical relationships and are often descended from larger
historical bands).
346.
25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child
under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to
the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended family;
(2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”
(emphasis added)).
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IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, whether or not the classification of “Indian
child” is seen as a racial or political classification, the ICWA
should pass all levels of constitutional scrutiny. The Fifth
Circuit en banc majority correctly determined the ICWA’s
definition of “Indian child” to be a political classification which
passes rational basis review. This reading is supported by the
historical and social context of federal Indian regulation, the
statutory interpretation of the ICWA itself, and the correct
application of Supreme Court precedent. However, even if the
statute is held to strict scrutiny review, the clearly compelling
purpose and careful tailoring of the statute, as well as the
inadequacy of race-neutral alternatives, demonstrate the
unquestionable constitutionality of the ICWA. Therefore, the
ICWA is constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution and should be upheld in future
courts as a crucial protection guaranteeing fair treatment for
Indian children.

